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TRACING THE CONTOURS OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS' HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Iris Halpernt
A human being. .. posses a dignity (an absolute inner
worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all
other rationale beings in the world. - Immanuel Kant'
INTRODUCTION
What meaning modern-day society ascribes to the term "human
rights" has long been understood as being heavily influenced by the twenti-
eth century's exposure to human destruction hitherto unimagined. Moti-
vated by the horrors of the Second World War, an international shift in
perspective occurred, underlying the construction of a new legal structure
increasingly invested in the inherent worth of the human condition. 2 For the
first time, the shield of state sovereignty gave way before grave transgres-
sions of humanitarian law, individual criminal liability was imposed, and an
expanded understanding of human rights emerged through the formulation
t J.D., 2008, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall). The
author would especially like to thank Professor Laurel Fletcher of Boalt Hall for
her comments on the first draft of this article. Thanks also to Andrea Shemberg of
the International Commission of Jurists and Professors Dinah Shelton of George
Washington University and Eric Clapham of the Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights for their thoughts while this article was
developing.
1 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 186 (M. Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge University Press 1996) (1797).
2 Ruti Teitel, Nuremberg and its Legacy: Fifty Years Later, in WAR CRIMES: THE
LEGACY OF NUREMBERG, 44, 45-53 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999); see also Joern
Eckert, Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law, in THE CONCEPT OF
HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 41, 52 (David Kretzmer & Eckart
Klein eds., 2002) ("The idea of human dignity was decisively strengthened by de-
velopments after the Second World War. After the terrible crimes and contempt
towards mankind by the Nazis, there was a sudden surge for stronger protection of
human dignity.").
130 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14
of a new subset of norms-"crimes against humanity"-which applied to
the internal relations between the State and its own nationals.'
These major principles-universal jurisdiction for grave breaches
of humanitarian law, the recognition of crimes against humanity, criminal
liability, and the construction of the individual as a direct subject of interna-
tional law-have been expanded upon in subsequent well-known proceed-
ings. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have reified
and expanded the substance of crimes against humanity and have lately
recognized independent criminal liability for non-state actors under interna-
tional law. 4 On the domestic front, a proliferation of activity has extended
the influence of the human rights discourse even further and, regionally,
such institutions as the European International Court of Justice have recog-
nized the capabilities of supranational organizations to enforce rights and
bear obligations under international human rights law.5 Overall, it may
safely be observed that the gains made in the past half century towards
protecting human rights far outstrip any previous gains in the international
forum.
However, despite such achievements, the international legal frame-
work, which dominated the imagination of post-World War II human rights
advocates and which underlies our modern day international institutions, is
encountering obstacles which threaten to undermine its future effective-
3 Teitel, supra note 2, at 47-52; Edward M. Wise, The Significance of Nurem-
berg, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 55, 55-65 (Belinda Cooper
ed., 1999); see also BINDA PREET SAHNI, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE LIABILITY:
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN INJURY 51-53 (2006).
4 See SAHNI, supra note 3, at 62-63. The ICTR omits a reference to "armed con-
flict" in its statute expanding human rights violations to times of peace. Meanwhile,
the ICTY codified the concept of crimes against humanity and also has recognized
that non-state actors, in collusion with the state, can commit human rights
violations.
5 See generally SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION (2004). The most well known activity involves the United
States' Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), though other common-law states are begin-
ning to see domestic litigation. Most litigation against transnational corporations
has happened in the United States because of plaintiff friendly laws such as ATCA,
the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and Racketeering Influence and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 16-17. In cases within the United States, the
courts have consistently noted "persons" under, for example, the TVPA, encompass
"artificial persons" including corporations. Id. at 61. Certain regional and interna-
tional systems subsequently held likewise. See SAHNI, supra note 3, at 60, 73-74
(Apartheid Conventions and The Barcelona Traction case before the ICJ).
2008 TRACING THE CONTOURS
ness.6 By focusing and imposing duties singularly upon the state, a break-
down of human rights protections has emerged in recent decades. This
failure, which I posit is a product of the systemic separation between inter-
national economic development, human rights enforcement, and the regula-
tion of private players, leaves powerful non-state actors, in particular
transnational corporations (TNCs), essentially unencumbered by responsi-
bility for the adverse effects caused by their policies or activities, despite
the increasing impact of their decisions. 7
Placing aside any arguments in support of or critiquing current eco-
nomic development strategies, the subject of the TNC's accountability for
human rights violations is being addressed on various levels with increasing
urgency. 8 The International Commission of Jurists has noted that the con-
6 See Philip Alston, The 'Not-A-Cat' Syndrome: Can the International Human
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 3-4 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); August Reinisch, The Changing
International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE
ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 73-77 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
7 See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of
Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L. 931, 935 (2004).
8 The role of TNCs in the new world order has generated nearly uniform opinion
that TNCs increasingly play a role in the violation of human rights due to their
increased economic and political influence. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corpora-
tions and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, Ill YALE L.J. 443,
461-465 (2001). Numerous international and regional organs have expressly noted
the issue in their instruments. See, e.g., Asian Human Rights Commission, Asian
Human Rights Charter, 2.8, May 17, 1998, available at http://material.ahrchk.net/
charter/pdf/charter-final.pdf (last visited May 1, 2008):
The capacity of the international community and states to pro-
mote and protect rights has been weakened by processes of
globalization as more and more power over economic and social
policy and activities has moved from states to business corpora-
tions. States are increasingly held hostage by financial and other
corporations to implement narrow and short sighted economic
policies which cause so much misery to so many people, while
increasing the wealth of the few. Business corporations are re-
sponsible for numerous violations of rights, particularly those of
workers, women and indigenous peoples. It is necessary to
strengthen the regime of rights by making corporations liable for
the violation of rights;
See also Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
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ceptualization and framing of corporate duties is the foremost question in
the current human rights debate.9 The necessary inquiry has three parts:
what is the underlying ideological theory for placing duties and obligations
upon the TNC (and upon all corporate entities) in the field of human rights,
how does recognizing and imposing responsibility for human rights viola-
tions unfold in a sovereign-based system, and, finally, what should be the
extent of those duties and obligations conceptually?' 0
In response to these inquiries, this Article argues that attempting to
impose a set of expressly-defined duties upon the TNC misconstrues and
ignores both the role of the TNC in the modern-day global context, and
problematically diverges from a history of international and domestic juris-
prudence which facilitates limited, but essential, flexibility in the develop-
ment of human rights norms by defining obligations and accountability
through the use of customary international law or fluid legislative
processes. 1" Rather than fixate on formulating an exact set of rigid duties,
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter UN Draft Norms]. Preamble:
Taking note of global trends which have increased the influence
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises on
the economies of most countries and in international economic
relations ... Noting that transnational corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises have the capacity to. . cause harmful impacts on
the human rights and lives of individuals through their core busi-
ness practices and operations. . .Noting also that new interna-
tional human rights issues and concerns are continually emerging
and that transnational corporations and other business enterprises
often are involved in these issues and concerns, such that further
standard-setting and implementation are required at this time and
in the future.
9 Phone Interview with Andrea Shemberg, member, International Commission of
Jurists, in Geneva, Switzerland (Nov. 13, 2006) (record on file with author).
10 This Article will be focusing only on an international law framework.
11 For example, the ICTR Statute enumerates rape as a crime against humanity
and war crime even thought the Nuremberg Statute did not. See Sita Balthazar,
Gender Crimes and the International Criminal Tribunals, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 43
(2006-2007). Domestic liability under the ATCA is expressly tied to breach of cus-
tomary international law and jus cogens, a constantly (though slowly) evolving
standard. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004) (in denying
Alvarez's ATS (ATCA) claim, the court held that brief detention did not constitute
a breach of customary law and thus was non-actionable); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28813, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (". . doing so
would frustrate Congress's intention to make crimes against humanity violations of
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this Article argues that, from ordinary human rights principles, economic
realities assessments, and models of corporate regulation in other interna-
tional spheres, a methodology may be derived which incorporates the
unique combination of legal personhood and growing contemporary control
and power of the TNC to determine how evolutionary customary norms and
their attendant responsibilities may be framed.
Part I of this Article briefly introduces the backbone of the human
rights discourse: the concept of dignity as the foundation for human rights
obligations from all actors regardless of their public or private character.
Part II develops, through human rights objectives, the rationale for
directly imposing legally-binding duties on the corporate entity, in particu-
lar the TNC. This Part first considers how TNCs have become several of
the primary beneficiaries of trade liberalization but have succeeded in evad-
ing strict regulation by virtue of their multinational nature and increased
power. 12 International economic development policies, favored by devel-
oped nations since the Second World War, have emphasized the primacy of
United States domestic law... The [TVPA] thus recognizes explicitly what was
perhaps implicit in the Act of 1789 - that the law of nations is incorporated into the
law of the United States and that a violation of the international law of human
rights is... a violation of US domestic law."), aff'd, 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, Plc., 487 F.3d 1193, 1200-1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (follow-
ing Sosa the test for ATCA standing is still a claim based in the "present-day" law
of nations), vacated on other grounds, rehearing en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923;
The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Filirtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 888 (2d Cir.
1980) ([courts must] "interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."); see also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006) (in response to more amorphous state obli-
gations to international human rights the Supreme Court noted that while the con-
tours of Common Article 3 were not strictly defined, the United States nonetheless
failed to meet whatever obligations did exist. While the outside perimeters of the
duty were not known, an inspection of the international community's criminal pro-
cedures at least illuminated what was not acceptable in constituting military tribu-
nals to try suspected terrorists according to the standards of civilized society).
12 See Sarah Joseph, An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multina-
tional Enterprises, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 75, 92 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000);
Ratner, supra note 8, at 459; 'Gbenga Bamodu, Managing globalisation, UK ini-
tiatives and a Nigerian Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM, 145, 162
(Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan eds., 2006); Anne Orford, Globalization and the
Right to Development, in PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 127, 158, 164 (Philip Alston ed., 2001)
(quoting Raghavan, and Nadar & Wallach respectively).
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lending and trade institutions such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization at the expense of state
agency. 13 The relationship, especially between dependant developing states
and TNCs, has become increasingly implicated by this intentional structural
reconfiguration of power. This Part then examines some of the negative
effects on the enjoyment of human rights experienced by the population due
to transformations in power privileging the TNC.14 The argument here is
not that equal and even greater violations of human rights and dignity have
not occurred at the hands of the State-for they assuredly have and con-
tinue to do so. Rather, the focus of this Part is on the necessity of emphasiz-
ing the responsibility of newly-emerging global players as well as the
historically powerful state. 15 The international legal system must be refash-
ioned so as to be capable of simultaneously regulating all the numerous
important actors vis-a-vis their human rights behavior. Despite the far-
reaching consequences of TNCs increasing influence, this Part will focus on
the proportionally-magnified effects experienced by the populations in de-
veloping countries.' 6 Though the ultimate theoretical analysis of this Article
will not focus purely on territoriality, it is widely noted that the immediate
effects of economic globalization have disparately affected those in devel-
oping nations.17
13 Orford, supra note 12, at 146-152, 157-158.
14 See Dinah Shelton, Globalization & The Erosion of Sovereignt
, 
in Honor of
Professor Lichenstein: Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 273, 294-299 (2002).
15 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2006 92-96, 140-145, 146-153, 154-
159, 179-186, 197-200, 227-231, 232-237, 284-289, 381-387, 423-431 (2006) (de-
tailed listing of violations by country. Some notable problem states include: DR
Congo, Sudan (with the crisis in the Darfur region), Uganda, Zimbabwe, Colombia,
Haiti, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Nepal, Russia, Uzbekistan, and many
others. However, though primarily focusing on national and rebel abuse, the report
did include a short piece analyzing TNC involvement in human rights. Id. at 41-51.
16 See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, Interna-
tional Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.,
243, 257-259 (2000); Shelton, supra note 14, at 295-296 (ex: working conditions
are poor in export production zones where a steep increase occurred by 2000 in
developing countries).
17 See, e.g., Paul Hunt & Simon Walker, WTO member states and the right to
health, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM 228, 244 (Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan
eds., 2006) (commitments to trade liberalization not uniformly imposed on all
states, developing acceding states may have increased demands leading to dimin-
ishment of states capacity to realize health rights); Uche' U. Ewelukwa, Centuries
of Globalization; Centuries of Exclusion: African Women, Human Rights, and the
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Part III of this Article briefly details contemporary attempts at con-
ceptualizing and grafting duties onto the TNC through international mecha-
nisms. Currently, the most acute pressure felt by TNCs to modify their
behavior results from concerted NGO and consumer action campaign activ-
ity. As a result, there has been a recent spate of self-regulation through
corporate ethics codes. On the international level, the most comprehensive
and prominent attempt at legislating corporate human rights obligations has
been the draft United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, adopted in 2003 by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights.18 Additionally, other international organs such as
the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and UN Secretary General
(through the Global Compact) have all attempted to grapple with this is-
sue. 19 Adjudication of TNCs' human rights obligations under international
law has yet to occur, but a series of decisions extending subjectivity to
various non-state actors under international human rights law bears scru-
tiny. Extensions of liability have occurred on the domestic front as well,20
particularly in the United States but also in other common-law
jurisdictions. 21
"New" International Trade Regime, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 75
(2005); see also UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 1999: GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE Chapter 1 (1999).
18 Tom Sorrell, The UN Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM 284, 284
(Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan, 2006); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Human
Rights Responsibilities of Business as Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 315, 328 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
19 Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 18, at 318-320; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note
7, at 949-952.
20 Coverage of domestic treatment is beyond the scope of this article though will
be occasionally referenced.
21 A majority of the litigation against TNCs for human rights abuses has been
pursued through civil litigation in the United States under the Alien Torts Claim
Act (ATCA), though recent cases have also occurred in other common-law juris-
dictions such as the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. See Reinisch, supra
note 6, at 55-56. Few domestic attempts at invoking universal jurisdiction for pros-
ecuting a corporation through criminal proceedings have occurred. Emailed Corre-
spondence with Andrew Clapham, Professor, Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, in Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 30, 2006) (re-
cord on file with author) (the only current criminal prosecution against corporate
officials for a violation of human rights is in Australia. Anvil Mining is being in-
vestigated by police for potential crimes against humanity for their admitted in-
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Part IV of this Article explores the contents of several innovative
theories currently circulating in the academy debating the proper basis for
and contours of TNC accountability. This Part will focus on the positive
aspects of these contemporary proposals and propose certain criticisms.
While no consensus has yet been attained, extensive and valuable work has
contributed to a comprehensive understanding of the topic and the United
Nations continues to invest its energies on the issue.
The final Part of this Article proposes a multi-level examination of
TNCs' relationships to affected populations and states in order to ascertain
the scope of the TNC's duties in any particular instance. If properly uti-
lized, this 'functionally equivalent' model of analysis could warn the TNC
of its duties and, to the extent any given state or individual is forewarned as
to what constitutes the discharge of obligations, help the TNC understand
what affirmative actions it must undertake. This calculation factors in the
juridical personhood status of the TNC in order to maintain the delineation
between public (state actor) and private (non-state actor) duties, and to de-
marcate the important differences between a corporation's role and the
state's role in global and national governance. At the same time, the indi-
vidual TNC's relationship with both the relevant populations and the state
must be assessed when attaching to it increased duties befitting an actor
with its resources, influence, and consciously-facilitated empowerment. 22
Considerations of positive and negative rights for which the TNC should
bear responsibility correlates roughly with the obligations of a state simi-
larly-situated in resources and influence, circumscribed however by the
concept of the TNC's private character and different purpose. To that end,
current debates surrounding the extent of the state's duties may very well be
replicated in future discussions seeking to further clarify TNCs' obligations.
volvement in a massacre at Kilwa in 2004 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
No decision has been taken by the prosecutor). See Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, OECD Watch Newsletter March 2006, available at
http://www.gernanwatch.org/tw/kwi-06-03.pdf (last visited May 1, 2008) (for ad-
ditional information regarding Anvil's action in DC Congo.); see also JOSEPH,
supra note 5, at 13 (Belgium's brief attempt before changing its universal jurisdic-
tion statute under political pressure).
22 The concept that corporations might fairly be treated uniquely specifically be-
cause of the state's facilitation of their unique access to resources (and potential
power) is domestically embodied in Supreme Court cases such as Austin v. Mich.
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 660 (1990). The Court upheld the constitu-
tionality the Michigan Campaign Finance Act holding that, "the unique state-con-
ferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants
the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can unfairly influence
elections when it is deployed." Id. at 652.
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It is at this juncture where the minimal, but still relevant, evolutionary pro-
cess of international human rights norm creation as it now applies to indi-
viduals and states must be recalled. By internationalizing corporate
accountability for human rights violations, the strengths of the current pro-
cess can be emphasized. Mechanisms of assistance and enforcement at the
international level should be uniformly established, but the norms them-
selves may evolve over time.
PART I: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MODERN DAY UNDERSTANDINGS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY
At the heart of the modern day investigation into who bears obliga-
tions under the human rights discourse is modernity's belief of the value of
the human subject in itself. While varying adaptations of the notion of "dig-
nity" date further back, the root of the modern day understanding, attributed
to the philosopher Immanuel Kant,23 invests every individual with an inher-
ent quality of dignity irrespective of social status.
But a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the sub-
ject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any
price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be
valued merely as a means to an ends of others or even to
his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he posses a
dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts re-
spect for himself from all other rationale beings in the
world. 24
The conceptualization of dignity formulated by Kant, that is, an ina-
lienable quality within each person serving as an ends unto itself, has been
espoused continuously, particularly in the wake of the Second Word War.25
For example, the German Federal Constitution does not allow the state to
derogate from the absolute right of human dignity through legislation or
national constitutional amendment; the right is inviolable.26 More than 170
governments meeting in Vienna at the Second World Conference on
Human Rights in 1993 recognized and affirmed the centrality of Kantian
23 See, e.g., Maxine Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 748 (2006); Izhak Englard, Uri and Caroline
Bauer Memorial Lecture: Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Con-
stitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 1919 (2000).
24 KANT, supra note 1, at 186.
25 Eckert, supra note 2, at 52.
26 Englard, supra note 23, at 1924.
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dignity in the formulation of human rights.27 And within American constitu-
tional jurisprudence the intrinsic dignity of even those criminally convicted
is embodied within the substantive protections of the Eighth Amendment. 2
The ICTY, in its judgment against local military police unit com-
mander Anto Furundzija, perhaps manifested the notion best when it con-
firmed outrages upon dignity as the underlying basis of crimes against
humanity. After his underlings threatened a Muslim female victim with a
knife, rubbing it against her thigh and then warning her they would
vaginally impale her with it, the violation of her dignity served as a proper
justification for construing the subsequent forcible oral sex as rape. 29
The forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual or-
gan constitutes a most humiliating and degrading attack
upon human dignity. The essence of the whole corpus of
international humanitarian law as well as human rights law
lies in the protection of the human dignity of every per-
son... The general principle of respect for human dignity is
the basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d'Etre of
international humanitarian law and human rights law; in-
deed in modern times it has become of such paramount im-
portance as to permeate the whole body of international law
27 ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 538-
539 (2006).
28 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (striking down the death
penalty for those under the age of eighteen) ("The Eighth Amendment guarantees
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows
from the basic 'precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to [the] offense.'. . By protecting even those convicted of hei-
nous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to re-
spect the dignity of all persons."); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311
(2002) (abolishing the death penalty for the developmentally disabled) ("The basic
concept underlying the EIGHTH AMENDMENT is nothing less than the DIGNITY of
man."); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1992) (resulting extent of injury
was not the proper inquiry for an Eight Amendment inquiry) ("the use of force
[cannot be] of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind'. . . To deny, as the
dissent does, the difference between punching a prisoner in the face and serving
him unappetizing food is to ignore the "concepts of DIGNITY, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency"' that animate the EIGHTH AMENDMENT"); Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (corporeal punishment a violation of human dignity) (use
of the hitching post under these circumstances violated the "basic concept underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment[, which] is nothing less than the dignity of man.").
29 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ] 39-41, 183
(Dec. 10, 1998).
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• . . It is consonant with this principle that such an ex-
tremely serious sexual outrage ... should be classified as
rape.30
Anchoring modernity's human rights discourse in the intrinsic and
inalienable worth of every human being radically shifts the way in which
human rights norms implicate various actors and international legal
processes. The repercussions of World War II undermined the traditional
purely statist approach to international human rights, 3' and finally incul-
cated in the collective conscience the duties, both positive and negative,
imposed on every actor under an increasingly universal comprehension of
dignity. Individuals became direct subjects of international law as a result-
ing expression of this essentialist truth.32 The consequences of embracing
human dignity as fundamental to society can be seen embodied in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which assigned positive and
negative human rights obligations to all individuals, irrespective of their
public or private character.3 3 Because dignity is vested in the individual and
emanates outwards from their person, all those who come into contact and
have the power to affect it bear obligations proportional to their capacity to
do harm or help. Similar refrains were echoed in the criminal trial of Alfred
Musema-Uwimama by the judges of the ICTR whom held that violations of
the prohibition on torture required no state action component for there to
exist liability under an international legal regime for crimes against human-
ity. 34 All participants in society interact with an individual's dignity and
thus have human rights obligations; dignity does not spring from the rela-
30 Id. at 183.
31 Diane F. Orentlicher, Internationalizing Civil War, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEG-
ACY OF NUREMBERG 154, 154 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999) (state-sovereign-oriented
approach has gradually been supplanted by a human-being oriented approach); see
also Louis Henkin, Lecture: That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and
Human Rights, Et. Cetera., 68 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 1, 3-5 (1999); Wise, supra note 3,
at 59.
32 See Teitel, supra note 2, at 50 (the belief is widely held today that a state's
persecution of its citizens is an international, even universal matter).
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at preamble, art.
30, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (Preamble: "every
individual and every organ of society. .to promote respect for these rights and
freedoms." Article 30: "nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any rights and freedoms set forth herein.").
31 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 543.
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tionship between an individual and the state, but between an individual and
all others.
PART II: THE CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: THE TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATION IN THE NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER
Section I. The Uncertain Treatment of Dignity in the 21st Century
While the object of individual dignity was integral to the under-
standing of the universal order following World War II, the structuring of
the new human rights legal regime was largely dominated by a world vision
preoccupied with the specter of the sovereign power's abuse of its own
citizens.3 5 To that end, while the legacy of the Nuremberg trials established
individual criminal liability for certain limited crimes,3 6 the international
human rights structure that sprung forth paralleled broader international law
principles and primarily targeted the state as the bearer of duties.
Recent criticisms questioning the validity and effectiveness of a
state-centric system in an increasingly diverse global order have surfaced.37
By juxtaposing the sanctity of innate human dignity against the growing
unregulated occurrences of human rights violations by non-state actors such
as TNCs, critics have been able to effectively illustrate a fallacy of the cur-
rent system, namely, that the international human rights framework should
be singularly, or at least primarily, concerned solely with state activities.
The impetus behind the original internationalizing of grave human rights
violations-that rights originate in the individual human being and effect
the obligations of all those who interact with him or her requires once
again a shifting of the focus of international law's efforts to promote human
rights compliance.
Section H.L Economic Globalization and the Rise of the TNC
To properly understand the contemporary debate surrounding the
scope of TNC human rights obligations, it must be contextualized in the
current political and economic landscape. This Article does not attempt to
35 Shelton, supra note 14, at 273; Reinisch, supra note 6, at 38; Kinley & Tadaki,
supra note 7, at 935.
36 Teitel, supra note 2, at 47-49.
37 See, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 5, at 1-4 (TNCs have more power than certain
states. The top 100 economies include 51 corporations. TNCs may abuse their
power); Alston, supra note 6, at 3 (assumption that the state is indispensable
marginalizes a significant part of international human rights law from one of its
largest challenges); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 933-935; Ratner, supra note
8, at 461 (system in which the sole target is states may not be sufficient).
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cover all the intricate and complex forces at play in economic globalization,
nor pass judgment on every one of its various social and political effects. A
discussion regarding TNC accountability does however require considera-
tion of some of the practical repercussions of this strategy of development.
One of the primary results of economic globalization has been the
diversification of powerful global actors.38 There is no inherent reason why
the results of this reconfiguration should generate a negative impact on
human rights, especially when the problematic history of states' abuse is
kept as a reference point.39 Proponents of economic globalization focus on,
for example, the "good governance" standards promoted by influential in-
ternational lending institutions as improving transparency in certain govern-
mental functions and therefore facilitating the positive enjoyment of civil
and political rights. 40 Others note the potential for positive change accom-
panying increased trade and direct investment have for the realization of
social, cultural, and economic rights through strengthening local econo-
mies. 41 Nor have advocates completely ignored the admittedly dispropor-
tionate gains produced by the globalization process. 42 Rather, as one
advocate theorizes, though positive effects have been to date disparately
experienced, nonetheless both parties prosper proportionately from a trade
or investment pareto-improving relationship. 43
38 See Bamodu, supra note 12, at 145; Orford, supra note 12, at 147-151, 157-
158; Alston, supra note 6, at 4; Reinisch, supra note 6, at 74; Shelton, supra note
14, at 276; see also, Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The
World Bank and Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159, 160
(1993).
39 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15.
40 See Jonathan Carlson, Symposium, Interrogating Globalization: The Impact on
Human Rights: Answering Antiglobalist Angst, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 21-22 (2002); CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 140 (supporting rule of law
and transparency helps human rights agenda).
41 See Carlson, supra note 40, at 22-27; Bamodu, supra note 12, at 152-153 (dis-
cussing the notorious regime under General Sanni Abacha and embezzlement prac-
tices costing the developing state some 2.2-5.2 billion dollars. Regulations on both
the state and now recommendations for TNCs regarding transparency assist in mak-
ing globalization beneficial for developing countries); CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at
140 (quoting IMF that government enhancement policies lead to attainment of
human rights in their broad sense); Shelton, supra note 14, at 292.
42 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 17, at 25, 31, 38.
43 JOHN BURTON, JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, TIMOTHY JOSLING & RICHARD STEINBERG,
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME 18 (2006) [hereinafter THE EVOLUTION OF
THE TRADE REGIME].
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Arguments espousing the positive ramifications of globalization do
not contradict the notion that some of the primary influences shaping to-
day's evolving system of global capital are the various new actors emerging
onto the international economic stage. Particularly in relation to conditions
in developing countries, relatively new actors including international finan-
cial and trade institutions, as well as private corporations, have had a great
impact on national conditions in addition to the traditional influences of
other states. 44 Since the 1980s, UN financial organs such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) have flexed their mus-
cle by imposing "structural adjustment" requirements as prerequisites to
ascendancy and the receiving of direct investment.45 After succeeding the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) following the Marrakesh
multilateral trade agreements of 1994 the World Trade Organization
(WTO), through stronger member states, 46 has leveraged significant control
of policy in developing nations by implementing asymmetric trade liberali-
zation requirements. Coupled with subsequent supplemental bilateral in-
vestment agreements (BITs) and regional trade agreements such as
NAFTA, 47 the policies of trade liberalization, privatization and governing
44 Id. at 164 (nations had to turn to the WB and IMF who would generally impose
certain policies. Case example Mexico); Orford, supra note 12, at 147-152; see also
Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 396 (1994) (massive additional transfers of foreign aid are
unlikely, international trade and investment are indispensable); Shelton, supra note
14, at 297-298; Anghie, supra note 16, at 256-257.
45 Structural adjustment programs for example generally require a country to cut
spending on social services, eliminate trade barriers to foreign corporations, priva-
tize national assets, and decrease wages among other actions. See Cristina Baez,
Michele Dearing, Margaret Delatour, & Christine Dixon, Multinational Enterprises
and Human Rights, 8 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183, Part B(2)(e) (2000);
see also Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interven-
tions after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 465-467 (1997).
46 Ewelukwa, supra note 17, at 113-117 (date adopted, and tracking the enforced
ban on protectionism in developing countries as compared to the protectionism
allowed developed countries); THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME, supra note
43, at 166-167 (developing countries though a majority generally excluded from
TRIPS talks despite grave concerns on the consequences and negative effects in
nations of sub-Sahara Africa on drug accessibility).
47 NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF Ac-
COUNTABILITY 237 (2002) (under Chapter 11, corporations have the ability to sub-
mit complaints against the states to binding dispute settlement); see generally
Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation
of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L & Bus. 327, 362-372 (1994).
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investment practices have cumulatively placed constraints on the state's
ability to fulfill some of its human rights obligations both directly and indi-
rectly.48 Changes imposed at the domestic level by these institutions include
undertaking large scale privatization and implementing trade liberalization
policies, intrastate non-discrimination requirements, reductions in govern-
ment spending, and labor market deregulation. 49 In many cases these trade
policies have substantially benefited the developing nation though the his-
torical trend has been a privileging of developed nations who dominate
institutional practices and the agenda and who have (somewhat understand-
ably) sought policies furthering their own national interests. 50
Until recently, the question of the non-state actor's role in the new
economic world order was largely ignored by both the international human
rights and international development and trade regimes. The question, how-
ever, has recently come to the forefront of the human rights debate with
48 See, e.g., Steve Aderman & Rohan Kariyawasam, TRIPS and bilateralism:
Technology transfer in a development perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPI-
TALISM 169, 169-185 (Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan eds., 2006) (dissecting the de-
sirably of a complementary competition regime to counter the influences of TRIPS-
plus agreements and adjudicatory trends in rolling back original TRIPS (Agreement
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) internal balancing mechanisms to
ensure appropriate intellectual property transfers for such reasons as public health.
Compulsory licensing rights under Article 27.3(a) are increasingly difficult to util-
ize threatening least developed countries ability to realize rights to health at the
profit of the four dominant blocs in the WTO, the United States, Canada, Japan,
and the European Union and TNCs); see also Patricia Feeney, The Human Rights
Implications of Zambia's Privatization Programme, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 323, 328-329
(Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (privatization in Zamibia increased poverty, social
service spending declined); Orford, supra note 12, at 157-158 ("[such agreements]
curb the right of governments to intervene in the economy for the benefit of their
people..."); Reinisch, supra note 6, at 77; Shelton, supra note 14, at 297-298;
Baez, Dearing, Delatour, & Dixon, supra note 45, at Part B(2)(e) (required to cut
spending on social services).
41 Orford, supra note 12, at 151; Anghi, supra not 18, at 256. Of particular note is
the tension between non-discrimination exemptions and the ability to utilize these
procedures in practice. See Fernne Brennan, Time for a change: Reforming the
WTO trading rules to take account of reparations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITAL-
ISM 254, 254-261 (Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan eds., 2006) (with Guyana rice trade
example).
51 See THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME, supra note 43, at 166-167;
Eweluka, supra note 19, at 113-117; Aderman & Kariyawasam, supra note 48, at
185.
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force. It stems from the fundamental tension created by structures of regula-
tion steeped in post-war state-centric ideology and the practical effects of
globalization which have largely diminished state authority in large por-
tions. The conflict is caused by the intentional devaluation of the sovereign
capacity of certain states, and the simultaneous benefits consequently real-
ized by other actors, for example TNCs, whom have been some of the larg-
est beneficiaries of deregulation policy, but who have escaped any
reciprocal imposition of concomitant obligations or duties towards human
rights.51
Several relevant aspects of international investment and trade pol-
icy figure centrally in the coming discussion on human rights duty bearing.
First, the way in which developing nations' sovereign agency over domestic
policy has been undermined as detailed above. Second, the process of eco-
nomic globalization has allowed many TNCs to accumulate vast sums of
resources and power, often times in excess of the host state's own.52 This
reality does not diminish the role of TNCs' home states as primary causes
or beneficiaries of contemporary trade and commercial policies, but the
TNC cannot be said to be a passive player or a non-entity in the process.53
As is popularly quoted, of the top one hundred economies in 1999, fifty one
51 WILLIAM H. MEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECON-
OMY IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS 75-76 (1998) (BITs et. al. linked to privatization of
least developed countries economies. WB and IMF structural reforms of the 1980s
and 1990s included privatization which necessarily enhanced investment opportu-
nities for transnational corporations. US policy to reduce debt in the developing
world was designed to lead directly to new direct foreign investment opportunities
for private corporations); Cecelia Wells & Juanita Elias, Catching the Conscience
of the King: Corporate Players on the International Stage, in NON-STATE ACTORS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 141, 146 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Ratner, supra note 8, at
458-459; Bamodu, supra note 12, at 162 ("It is also fair to say that a coalescence of
the interests of governments in developed countries and TNCs .... have contrib-
uted to the conclusion of agreements and the generation of rules under the WTO
framework that seem to focus principally on advancing the interests of TNCs... it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the direct primary beneficiaries of these agree-
ments are international business enterprises."); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at
935-937; Alston, supra note 6, at 17; Aderman & Kariyawasam, supra note 48, at
181 (bilateral trade agreements have obtained better conditions for national treat-
ment of TNCs).
52 See Alston, supra note 6, at 17.
53 See Bamodu, supra note 12, at 162.
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were corporations.14 The sales of the top five corporations exceeded the
gross domestic product of 182 countries. 55 And the top 200 corporations'
combined sales were larger than the combined economies of all countries
except the top ten. 56 Whatever one thinks of these numbers in isolation,
when they are positioned in the larger context, they realistically indicate a
practical power imbalance between the TNC and developing states, both
literally and in the sense of effecting political will.5 7 Third, enforcement
mechanisms established by international investment and trade organizations
have conferred limited rights of standing to the TNC, further facilitating its
agglomeration of power in relation to the state and also in relation to those
populations effected by its activities to whom no reciprocal remedies or
rights have as of yet been granted.58 TNCs have the ability in certain cir-
cumstances to challenge policies they deem unfavorable through interna-
tional quasi-judicial infrastructure, or often times through mechanisms
established by mandatory private regimes such as the international binding
54 SARAH ANDERSON AND JOHN CAVANAGH, THE RISE OF CORPORATE GLOBAL




57 See Wells & Elias, supra note 51, at 146-148 (attract rather than regulate inter-
national capital); see also Joseph, supra note 12, at 78; Ratner, supra note 8, at 461;
see generally Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human
Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
227, 237-238 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (host states may not have the resources or
political will, especially those committing violations themselves); Kinley & Tadaki,
supra note 7, at 938 (in developing states domestic regulation may be compromised
by economic considerations due to an unequal relationship with the TNC).
58 See THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOL-
UNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGA-
TIONS OF COMPANIES 12-13 (2002) [hereinafter BEYOND VOLUNTARISM] (regional
FTA and NAFTA provide recourse to TNCs through panels). The World Bank has
recently instituted "Inspection Panels" to consider individual complaints. See Rei-
nisch, supra note 6, at 42. The World Bank's Inspection panels do consider com-
plaints against TNCs or human rights violations complaints per se, but will review
complaints against its own decision for proper procedural safeguards. While human
rights are not expressly stated as a proper complaint, there are signs that the WB
may extend its considerations in that direction after the Chad Pipeline Report
though they are not wholly there yet. See CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 152-155.
Both the IMF and WB have been reticent in the past to allow human rights consid-
erations to enter their decisions. Id. at 135-140; see also Shelton, supra note 14,
289-291.
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arbitration systems provided for in many BITs and several multilateral trade
agreements.5 9
Other attributes of development policy play a relevant part in
globalization's recasting of the power dynamic. The complicated interplay
of foreign aid for example, as distinctly separate from investment or trade
policy, may implicate human rights by its own volition. 60 But the increasing
import of TNCs in the various models, and especially in the space of eco-
nomic globalization as a whole, compels the world to question what the
extent of their responsibilities towards human rights should be in a way
hitherto unnecessary before. Resources and power historically reserved for
the state were, at least in theory, held accountable against abuse either by
local democracy, or in cases of pluralism failure, by the international legal
system. As power and resources increasingly shift to private non-state ac-
tors, their roles must inevitably be scrutinized under the rubric of human
rights more conscientiously-not because TNCs did not have obligations
prior to this point, (all actors capable of effecting the dignity of the individ-
ual have such obligations)-but because their potential to either promote
the realization of human rights or harm that realization and escape liability
for doing so has exponentially increased.
Section III: Contemporary TNC Behavioral and Relational Examples
To illustrate the necessity of integrating TNCs into the human
rights framework of the future one needs only, unfortunately, to look in the
year's headlines. Contemporary popular press examples of disturbing cor-
porate behavior include Coca-Cola and a multiplicity of other TNCs, mostly
from East Asian countries, investing in Sudan (which is receiving invest-
ment capital from the IMF and WB) despite the humanitarian crisis continu-
ing in Darfur. 61 Or we can turn to an incident from October 2006 in which
Trafigura (a Greek-owned tanker) released a highly toxic cocktail of pe-
trochemical waste across from poor neighborhoods in Abidjan off the Ivory
Coast while attempting to cut costs on a waste management procedure, kill-
ing ten and causing 100,000 people to seek medical treatment. 62
59 Reinisch, supra note 6, at 85; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 946; Aderman
& Kariyawasam, supra note 48, at 181.
60 MEYER, supra note 51, at 104-108, 115 (but note US aid is increasingly at-
tached to requirements of direct relationship to the gifting nation, opening up op-
portunities for TNCs as well).
61 Jeffrey Gettleman, War in Sudan? Not Where the Oil Wealth Flows, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at Al.
62 Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Global Sludge Ends in Tragedy for Ivorv"
Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at Al; Editorial, An African Dumping Ground,
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A well documented history of corporate practices infringing on the
enjoyment of human rights exists. It is not only a recent phenomenon. A
well recognized historic example of direct interference with the political
and civil right to self-determination was the actions of International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. (ITT) in the early 1970s. The TNC actively con-
spired with the United States Central Intelligence Agency to keep then
Chilean candidate Salvador Allende from the presidential post before his
election to the position. 63 It is also widely believed that ITT and other
American corporations operating in Chile thereafter helped orchestrate the
fatal military coup which eliminated Allende and installed the violent mili-
tary regime of General Augusto Pinochet in 1973 .64 More recently, a hand-
ful of claims against transnational oil corporations operating in Nigeria are
slowly wending their way through the American domestic legal system,
utilizing the ATCA as a mode of redress for tort violations contravening
customary international human rights law abroad.65 The plight of the Ogoni
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria was widely publicized by an Amnesty
International campaign in the mid-1990s after the execution of poet and
community rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders for their
protests against Shell Oil's iniquitous behavior. Shell frequently spilled oil
on Ogoni land, failed to compensate the community either for the use of its
resources or for the ruination of the surrounding environment, and assisted
the Nigerian government in committing lethal campaigns against commu-
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, at A30; Lydia Polgreen, Neglect and Fraud Blamed for
Toxic Dumping in Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006, at A14; Daniel Wallis,
West Should Help Ivory Coast pay for toxic dumping-UN, REUTERS, Nov. 24, 2006,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L24487273.htm (last visited May 1,
2008); BBC News, Ivorians to sue toxic shipfirm, BBC NEWS, Oct. 24, 2006, http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa16079724.stm (last visited May 1, 2008).
63 Intelligence Activities: Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Gov-
ernmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
reprinted in 7 Convert Action 158-160 (381-386) (1975) (legislative history detail-
ing ITT's specific involvement in Chilean coup); see also MEYER, supra note 51, at
178-183; JOSEPH, supra note 5, at 3; Wells & Elias, supra note 51, at 143-144.
64 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 201; see also Jeffrey K. Powell, Comment, Prohi-
bition on Campaign Contributions from Foreign Sources: Questioning their justifi-
cation in a global Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 957, at
977-978 (1996); Jan Huner, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Re-
view of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in LIABILITY OF MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 197, 201 (Mennot T.
Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
65 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 63209 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Ki-
obel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28813 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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nity protesters. 66 Continuing violations by Chevron are charged despite Ni-
geria's transition back to democracy after the death of military dictator
General Abacha.67
The behaviors of Shell Oil and ITT are of the easier subset to con-
demn. For one, they implicate only negative duties; one shall not eliminate,
or conspire to eliminate, another individual's right to life or self-determina-
tion through one's own actions. These types of obligations proscribe certain
generally-cognizable depraved behaviors. They require little affirmative ef-
forts from the actor to assist others in fully realizing their rights, but only
require that he or she refrain from destroying rights directly. Second, as is
exemplified by the Shell Oil example, a TNC's transgressive actions may
under a certain new mode of analysis also conceivably carry with them
criminal liability, that is, Shell's behavior because it has risen to the level of
crimes against humanity and grave breaches of international customary
norms could be found criminally culpable and certain individuals in the
corporation be held liable.68 Through this lens of analysis, shaping the con-
66 See generally Kristian Tangen, Kare Rudsar & Helge Ole Bergesen, Con-
fronting the Ghost: Shell's Human Rights Strategy, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL
INDUSTRY 185, 185-187 (Asbjom Eide et al. eds., 2000) (Shell experienced wide-
spread fall-out for refusing to intervene on behalf of Wiwa and for refusing to take
positive steps and apply pressure on the government to comply with human rights
norms. The article then goes on to detail Shell's policy changes subsequent to the
events and the improvements they have attempted to make due to public pressure
and declining financial worth); see generally Chinedu Reginald Ezetah, Sympo-
sium, Minority Rights: International Law of Self-Determination and the Ogoni
Question: Mirroring Africa's Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 811, 820 (1997) (per SPDC's request for security, "wasting operations"
were suggested in a memo); Alston, supra note 6, at 11-13.
67 Amnesty International, Nigeria Ten Years On: Injustice and Violence haunt the
oil Delta, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR440222005 (last visited
Mar. 20, 2007); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILI-
TIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 10 (1999), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-I0.htm (last visited May 1, 2008)
(discussing the now often referenced memorandums between the Nigerian Security
Forces and Shell suggesting the "wasting operations" and "wasting targets" - § The
Role of Shell in the Ogoni Crisis).
68 The ATCA does not attach criminal liability but grants civil remedy to viola-
tions which fall into categories which international criminal tribunals have deemed
criminal behavior such as crimes against humanity and grave breaches of interna-
tional customary norms. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis
63209; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28813 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
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tours of corporate responsibility seems fairly simple. One could merely
deconstruct the TNC, as one does the state in international criminal pro-
ceedings and hold the highest echelons responsible through "commander
responsibility" principles for actions of their inferiors. To address any perti-
nent relationships between a TNC and its subsidiary, the common-law prin-
cipal/agent test for tort liability could potentially be applied. Thus, a simple
framework exists for establishing responsibility by imposing the subset of
norms encompassing criminality under international law.
However, a closer assessment of these case examples questions the
desirability of adopting such a method of resolution. Initially springing to
mind is the corporation's unique recourse to capital necessary to effectively
remediate grave human rights violations. Individuals, even wealthier per-
sons located within the corporation, are unable to produce similar resources.
The example of Coca-Cola in Sudan, for example, also problematizes the
decision to delineate human rights duties according to an actor's active in-
volvement or planning in the violation as adopting the purely negative obli-
gation approach of criminal liability forces us to do.69 The corporate
practices occurring in Sudan echo the large-scale business community's in-
volvement in buttressing the apartheid regime of South Africa. TNCs sus-
tained and benefited from the oppressive policies, a practice so troubling
that the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission investigated
and reported on the subject.70 The case of Coca-Cola in Sudan and TNCs'
involvement in apartheid South Africa also illuminate another important in-
69 American Courts under ATCA claims have somewhat adopted this negative
obligation approach. See In Re: South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp.
2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss because merely
transacting business in and with S.A. was not actionable claim under ATCA); see
also The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
300-302 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss and distinguish-
ing from In Re: South African Apartheid Litigation because knowingly assisting in
the attacks of civilian populations was not synonymous to business transacting),
aff'd, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18410 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
70 Ratner, supra note 8, at 477; see also Sigrun I. Skogly, Economic and Social
Human Rights, Private Actors and International Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 239,
254-255 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (once sanctions did occur, they had a deci-
sive effect. Originally many TNCs had lobbied against them arguing that other
states would allow TNCs to do business with S.A. so sanctions were not a good
tool. Bishop Tutu made the ethical point, "Not complying with sanctions just be-
cause somebody else is out there who will not comply, is just like seeing a girl
hitch hiking along the road, and picking her up and raping her, as surely, somebody
else will come along and do it anyway.").
150 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14
quiry, that is, if the state itself is a perpetrator, does it appropriately follow
that the non-state actor bears no responsibility for his or her own actions
merely because they are sanctioned by the state or because they financially
profit from it? Regulation is highly unlikely to come from Khartoum, as it
was unlikely to flow from the Boer plutocracy, a fact known by the whole
of the global community.7 1 Another particularly illustrative contemporary
example of such mutually complicit human rights violations is mining giant
Rio Tinto Plc. which combined forces with the Papua New Guinean state to
suppress local protests over its destructive mining policies. Their joint ac-
tion, which will be explored infra example III of this Part, caused a civil
war which culminated in 20,000 civilian deaths. Does the fact that the state
desires, or at the very least allows, a TNC's objectionable behavior or meth-
ods mean that the TNC should act with legal impunity and compound, or at
the very least benefit from, any state initiated harm?
These questions insinuate that fully applying the human rights dis-
course to TNCs complicates the situation beyond the capacity which a sim-
ple national/individual or non/criminal polarity can handle. In essence,
should TNCs bear obligations to assist with the realization of a penumbra of
non-international customary norm human rights enumerated in the UDHR
and other treaties rather than being limited interacting only with rights car-
rying criminal penalties if violated? Why only impose negative obligations
if TNCs are central to the new economic world order? How should the often
international or decentralized character of TNCs figure into their
responsibilities ?72
71 See De Schutter, supra note 57, at 237 (cannot count on the host state when
they are actively violating human rights).
72 For example, Trafigura created environmental damage and illness resulted there
from. The rights to environment and health have not been expressly defined inter-
nationally though they do exist. Many countries in fact struggle with new IP trade
regime regulations as noted earlier, constraining them from providing desperately
needed drugs. See Anderman & Kariyawasam, supra note 54; Hunt & Walker,
supra note 17. Similarly, environmental damage has received much attention in
recent years, but it too has no distinct borders. Almost all TNCs and states generate
pollution which results in health problems; such behavior is generally not con-
ceived of as criminal under international law though increasingly, human rights
obligations are being imposed. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, International Decisions:
Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (Action Center for Social and Eco-
nomic Rights v. Nigeria) Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, 96 A.J.I.L. 937, 939
(2002) (Nigeria found to have breached obligations to respect, promote, and fulfill
the rights guaranteed under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
including right to environment. The right is closely linked to economic and social
rights. No criminal liability for breach attached, the proper obligations and remedy
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In considering these questions Professor David Kinley and Barrister
Junko Tadaki highlight the reality that the rights most prone to TNCs'
abuse are those historically labeled economic, social and cultural rights-
the very rights which do not carry criminal liability when violated. In a
similar vein, Professor Steven Ratner argues that to apply the subset of
norms applicable to the individual (criminal), and forego the broader set of
duties imposed upon the state, is to ignore the fact that the TNC is neither in
capacity or power identical to a natural person, and should therefore not be
treated as such.73 These observations go to the heart of the debate. A full
range of questions is ignored by retaining a dichotomous human rights
framework. These omissions are perhaps best explored through a more in-
depth focus on some of the contemporary examples found in the main-
stream media: Trafigura, Coca-Cola, and the litigation against British min-
ing giant Rio Tinto this past year under the ATCA in the United States.
74
Transnational Corporation Example I: Trafigura
Cote d'Ivoire (the Ivory Coast) became independent from France in
1960.75 Located in the western part of the African continent, this state of
seventeen million currently lead by President Laurent Gbagbo has been
plagued with violence despite initially ceasing hostilities from civil war in
2003 and an African Union brokered peace accord in 2005.76 Impasse this
past year caused a steady stream of human rights violations by both govern-
ment and rebel forces including extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary
detentions. 77 Less-well publicized human rights violations by the state in-
cluding the failure to provide education, healthcare, and to promote the rule
of law are also systematically occurring.7 1
This past August, local residents of the poor neighborhoods north
of Abidjan woke up to find a toxic compound of petrochemical waste flood-
includes permitting independent monitoring and publicizing impact studies, provid-
ing information to effected communities, and providing avenues for meaningful
dissent).
7' Ratner, supra note 8, at 494-495.
71 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
75 The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/countrylisting.html (last vis-
ited May 1, 2008).
76 Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 85.
77 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 85.
78 Id. at 86. The World Bank has even listed Cote d'Ivoire on its 2006 LICUS List
(Low-Income Countries Under Stress; recently termed "Fragile States") along with
Sudan, http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/icus06_map.html.
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ing their communities causing wide-spread illness and multiple deaths.79
The Greek-owned tanker which had contained the waste was leased to
Trafigura, a London branch of a Swiss trading corporation. 80 Originally
Trafigura negotiated a $15,000 disposal fee with the Netherlands for what it
depicted as regular "slops" waste, but Dutch officials refused to dispose of
the compound for the price negotiated when the quantity on board exceeded
the amount projected and tests motivated by unexpected dock worker ill-
nesses detected previously undisclosed hazardous toxin traces. 81 The Dutch
authorities recalculated the disposal fee and demanded $300,000 which
Trafigura refused to pay despite 28 billion dollars in revenue for 2005-a
sum greater than the GDP of Cote d'Ivoire. 82 Without discharging, the ves-
sel traveled to Estonia, took on oil products, and then after unloading its
stock in Nigeria traveled on to Cote d'Ivoire where the TNC allegedly
reached a deal with a local enterprise to dispose of the waste.83 International
experts from France, Holland, and Britain strenuously assert that any oil
trader could easily ascertain that Cote d'Ivoire had no facilities capable of
handling the high level waste carried by the vessel. 84 A spokesperson for
Trafigura refused to acknowledge the company bore any responsibility for
the disaster.85
Trafigura claimed Ivorian officials gave permission to the TNC to
discharge the refuse in their port for $20,000.86 A government report found
that "Tommy," the enterprise Trafigura had contracted with for disposal of
the waste, was a shell company created during the period the tanker had left
Holland on its way to Cote d'Ivoire. 87 The same report found that officials
at the city's port and in multiple senior government positions were negli-
gent in their monitoring of the waste, and had permitted the discharge to go
forward despite repeated warnings of the compound's toxic nature.88 The
report concluded that the illegal dumping was due to mismanagement, cor-
ruption and fraud, and negligent oversight by government agencies and offi-
79 Polgreen & Simons, supra note 62.
80 Id.; Editorial, supra note 62; Polgreen, supra note 62; Wallis, supra note 62.
81 Polgreen & Simons, supra note 62.
82 Id.; The World Factbook, supra note 75.
83 Polgreen & Simons, supra note 62.
84 Id.; see BBC News, supra note 62 ("known or should have known" claims are
the charges in a lawsuit being pursued in Dutch courts).
85 Wallis, supra note 62.
86 Polgreen & Simons, supra note 62; Editorial, supra note 62; Polgreen, supra
note 62.
87 Polgreen, supra note 62.
88 Id.
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cials.8 9 Similar political conditions as well as minimal or non-existent
domestic dumping laws have long made many countries in the African con-
tinent particularly susceptible to the harms caused by the practice of export-
ing and dumping industrialized nations' hazardous waste.90
The Trafigura example illustrates several inadequacies in applying
either the state/non-state actor model or the individual criminal liability
model to the TNC's responsibilities for human rights. First, we must ask
ourselves how far we as an international community wish to expand the
number and nature of violations which warrant criminal culpability consid-
ering the gravity of the punishment attached. Should grossly negligent,
reckless, or knowing destruction of the environment resulting in death or ill
health be included within the purview of criminal law or should we view
this type of human rights violation through the human rights option of non-
criminalized obligations? If we feel the latter, there is no current recourse
for applying human rights obligations upon TNCs under the existing inter-
national human rights structure. If we believe the former, only certain indi-
viduals and not the corporate entity itself will suffer the very grave
consequences for an expanded definition of human rights violations, forgo-
ing the potential benefit which a TNC's substantial financial resources and
institutional strength afford recovery efforts such as those required by mass
environmental degradation. This observation implicates the second question
which the Trafigura example raises, namely, should Trafigura have any
monetary obligation as an independent actor to assist in clean-up and any
subsequent rebuilding efforts even though the TNC was given permission
by state authorities to dispose of the waste? Lastly, do we believe Trafigura
had any positive obligations to avoid the disaster? Answering yes would be
an impossibility under the international criminal liability model which is
predicated on a negative obligation theory. To what extent was Trafigura
obliged to investigate claims made by the contracted agent and governmen-
tal authorities that the waste would be properly disposed of considering the
constructive notice it had regarding the potential illegality of the proposi-
tion? Indicators included Holland's sixteen times higher fee assessment for
89 Id.; see also Franz Wild, Ivory Coast Officials Faulted in Report, THE Associ-
ATED PRESS, Feb. 24, 2006, available at http://www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/
2006Nov27.doc (last visited May 1, 2008).
90 Wallis, supra note 62; Polgreen, supra note 62; see generally Hugh J. Marbug,
Note, Hazardous WASTE Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental
Racism, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251, 257-259, 263-268 (1995) (discussing the
disproportionate effect of toxic waste dumping on African countries who largely
accept the waste because of their economic situation. Also discussing the develop-
ing nations support for the Basel Convention in contrast to developed nations).
1532008
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proper incineration of the compound, known traces of hazardous toxins pos-
itively identified in the waste, and the wide-spread knowledge that countries
in Africa such as Cote d'Ivoire are internationally renown as primary illegal
dumping locations because they lack the legal and technical institutional
capacity to halt the activity and are often times poorly overseen and eco-
nomically mismatched. 91 Developed countries have often refused to sign
conventions which eliminate their ability to export hazardous waste to de-
veloping countries for many of those reasons enumerated above. 92
Transnational Corporation Example II: Coca-Cola
Coca-Cola Corporation finds itself participating in several corpo-
rate activities recently which provide substance for contemplation. As men-
tioned before, in 2002 Coca-Cola began operating a factory in Sudan using
syrup legally exported into the country under the food and medicine exemp-
tion to the currently-existing sanctions.93 Meanwhile, ATCA, TVPA, and
RICO claims have been brought against the TNC in American federal court
seeking parent liability for a Coca-Cola subsidiary's orchestrating of a
union leader's murder by Colombian paramilitary forces. 94 Finally, Coca-
Cola and other companies situate themselves in the heart of the broader
debate surrounding water privatization, bottled water profitability, and pub-
lic aquifer exploitation for commercial purposes, an issue with vast poten-
tial impact on the basic human rights of poorer populations in developing
countries as access to water is causally deteriorating, the most prominent
example at the moment being India. 95
91 Wallis, supra note 62.
92 Marbug, supra note 90, at 270.
93 Gettleman, supra note 61.
94 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (attempt-
ing to hold parent corporation Coca-Cola USA liable for subsidiary's actions; the
plant manager allegedly orchestrated the paramilitary action against union activists
in the plant resulting in victim's assassination. Coca-Cola's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction granted. Some claims against remaining defend-
ants for the activity under ATCA survive). Prior reports of similar behavior involv-
ing Coca-Cola surfaced in Guatemala. See Amnesty International, Maquila
Workers Among Trade Unionists Targeted, Feb. 1995, http://www.amnestyusa.org/
business/document.do?id=2938BC265CF761A4802569A5007157EA (last visited
May 1, 2008). Current reports are arising in Nicaragua. See WAR ON WANT, COCA-
COLA, THE ALTERNATIVE REPORT 8-9 (2006), available at http://www.waronwant.
org/downloads/cocacola.pdf.
95 See generally, Douglas A. Kysar, Symposium, Of Waterbanks, Piggybanks, and
Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in Water Law: VI: Market Misgivings: The Role
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World-wide Coca-Cola's products are quite possibly the most
widely disseminated in history. The only four countries in which Coca-Cola
does not have a market are Myanmar, Cuba, Syria and Iraq.96 In 2003, ex-
pected revenue for the TNC was estimated at 21 billion dollars, with two-
thirds of it generated abroad (Coca-Cola is an American based TNC). 97
Third-quarter results for 2006 reveal revenues totaling 5.2 billion dollars
with the net profit for the quarter equaling 213 million dollars. 98
The three states used as foils to Coca-Cola in this Part share several
commonalities, but more relevant for the purposes of this Article, contain
substantial differences in internal conditions. Sudan, since obtaining inde-
pendence in 1956, has been embroiled in two prolonged civil wars rooted in
of Private Global Governance: Sustainable Development and Private Global Gov-
ernance, 83 TEX. L. REv. 2109 (2005) (Coca Cola in India and the threat to the
right to water in the future); see also Mark Williams, Parched village sues to shut
tap at Coke Drought-hit Indians say plant is draining groundwater, SAN FRAN-
CISCO CHRONICLE, March 6, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/arti-
cle.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/03/06/MNGE2BL7161.DTL (last visited May 1, 2008); War
on Want, supra note 101, at 4-7 (including drop in water table numbers); Public
Citizen, India: Demand that Coca-Cola Stop stealing Water, http://www.citizen.
org/cmep/Water/cmepWater/reports/india/ (last visited May 1, 2008); see gener-
ally Jens Loewe, Global Wars for Water, Facts on World Hunger and Poverty
ASIAN WATER BUSINESS.coM, Dec. 17, 2005, http://www.asiawaterbusiness.com/
news-show.php?language=english&n-id=906 (EU in GATS negotiations requiring
opening up of markets for water privatization. At the moment, Coca-Cola's actions
are very controversial "where the extremely poor Indians are no longer allowed
access to water that was once "their own." In addition to this, the wells are being
sunk deeper and deeper (to a depth of several hundred metres in some places) and
the ground water-level is falling further and further." Also, Coca-Cola runs a pri-
vate bottled water line, Dasani, which is extremely profitable and was discovered to
be purified tap water being sold at a cost of 2.80 euros a litre while the same water
as tap water would have cost 0.076 cents). Bottled water profitability intersects
with the increasingly inaccessible public water supplies, creating questions of af-
fordability of water for drinking and agriculture for poorer populations.
96 Paul Klebnikov, Coke's Sinful World, Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/2003/1222/086.html (last visited May 1, 2008) "Here's the part Douglas
Daft left out: Building business overseas requires dealing with the devil and other
questionable characters. . .Coke has had to endure that and more as it expands
relentlessly into the globe's last nooks and crannies.").
97 Id.
98 Atlanta Business Chronicle, Coca-Cola Enterprise profit at $213 M in third
quarter, Oct. 26, 2006, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/atlanta/stories/
2006/10/23/daily33.html (last visited May 1, 2008).
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ethnic hostilities.99 Khartoum, the capital of this forty one million person
state, 100 saw large amounts of violence and death despite a peace accord
reached for southern region autonomy between the Muslim government and
the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 2005.101 The crisis in
Darfur continues unabated and government militias have indiscriminately
raped, killed, and displaced millions of civilians who share the rebel forces'
ethnicities. 10 2 The conditions in Darfur reached such a height in March of
2005 that the U.N. Security Council made its first ever state referral to the
newly standing International Criminal Court. 103 Rebel groups were also ex-
tremely brutal. 104 Despite the grave and systemic human rights violations in
Sudan, needed oil reserves coupled with the government's implementation
of IMF and WB macroeconomics policies have brought an increase of in-
vestment into the country.105 Seeking natural resources to fuel its large eco-
nomic expansion at home, China weakened a U.N. Security Council
sanctions resolution and refused to exert pressure on the Sudanese regime
for its human rights abuses. China also supplied military and financial sup-
port to the government, as did several TNCs.10 6
Unlike Sudan, Columbia has stabilized somewhat in the recent past
few years, though guerilla forces, government backed paramilitary groups,
and state troops still commit violence against civilians regularly, making
Columbia the most problematic state for human rights in South America in
2006.107 Colombia is also home to the second largest population of inter-
99 The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
297-299 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); World Factbook, supra note 75; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 140-145.
100 World Factbook, supra note 75.
101 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 143.
102 Id. at 140.
103 Id. China abstained rather than use its permanent veto power. Id. at 255.
104 Id. at 142.
105 Getfleman, supra note 61; World Factbook, supra note 75 (economic statistics
section).
106 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 25; The Pres-
byterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (plaintiff TNC hired security officers to coordinate strategy with the govern-
ment, predecessor corporation repaired military vehicles and supplied utilities to
military bases).
107 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 179-186; see
also RIchard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights Sys-
tem: Activities from Late 2000 Through October 2002, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
651, 733-736 (cases arising from Columbia's continuing internal armed conflict. A
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nally-displaced persons behind Sudan. 10 8 The Colombian Constitutional
Court found the government's program of assistance to the internally-dis-
placed insufficient in 2004.109 The following year the Court found that
changes in the governmental program enacted to comply with the Court's
original order were inadequate, and that the government had evidenced a
lack of political will for instituting serious alterations. 110 Despite persistent
violence, President Alvaro Uribe's economic domestic reforms have won
some accolades from international lending institutions.11 1 However, govern-
ment-linked paramilitary groups are linked to wide-spread systematic at-
tacks on labor organizers, often with the assistance of TNCs. 112 Colombia is
one of the deadliest states in the hemisphere in recent history for union
activists, its actions infringing upon not only jus cogens human rights
norms such as the prohibition on extrajudicial executions and torture, but
constraining the realization of a set of rights falling under the broad panoply
of social, economic, and cultural rights.
Finally we contrast Coca-Cola to India, the second most populous
nation in the world with a figure of over one billion. India gained indepen-
dence from Britain in 1947 after being lead by the non-violent advocate
Mohandas Gandhi. Although the state has made notable gains in its human
rights record, problems still exist regarding abuses in the contested territory
of Kashmir, and the Indian government has failed to reform its police forces
who regularly utilize torture.1' 3 Caste-based hierarchies have been banned
by law, but violence continues against certain historically marginalized
groups, and Hindu-Muslim tensions perceiver. 114 On the other end of the
spectrum, India's economy has averaged a 7% GDP increase every year
since 1997, including 2006, where it achieved an 8.5% increase. 115 Poverty
has been reduced by an estimated 10%.116 A large sector of the population
historical analysis of the conflict indicates that the government is presumptively
behind paramilitary attacks on civilians).
108 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 184.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"' World Factbook, supra note 75.
112 See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see
also Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala.
2003).
"I HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 262-263.
114 Id. at 264-265.
115 World Factbook, supra note 75.
116 Id.
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is educated and bilingual. 117 The rapid speed of development, however, has
increased the exposure of civilians to avoidable industrial accidents without
impelling the concomitant implementation of proportionate civilian protec-
tions; a common trend in developing nations seeking to attract needed for-
eign investment in the form of TNCs' business.1 18 The 1984 accident in
Bhopal graphically illustrated the damage a TNC's negligence could inflict
on a community and the concurrent gaps which quick modernization ren-
dered in the state institutions meant to regulate corporate behavior or pro-
tect applicable constituencies. Over 1,500 persons died and 200,000 made
ill within days of a poisonous gas leak at the Union Carbide of India Ltd.
plant in Bhopal. 119 After calculating fatalities caused by the ill-effects of
long-term exposure, the death toll is estimated at approximately 15,000.120
At the time of the disaster the surrounding community was unaware that a
damp cloth placed over their faces would have shielded them from a lethal
exposure. 121 Victims seeking relief filed actions in the United States, but the
suits were dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens even
though Indian courts were too procedurally underdeveloped to effectively
host the lawsuits at the time of the dismissal. 22
The activities and comparative relationships Coca-Cola pursues in
these three countries raises a whole set of considerations further complicat-
ing and troubling any attempt at grafting the current international human
rights framework onto TNCs. First, as implicated by Coca-Cola's interac-
tion with Sudan, should a TNC bear the duty to withhold from investing in
or profiting from objectively highest-level repressive regimes-in other
words states in breach of norms carrying criminal culpability such as geno-
cide? In analyzing the questions arising from Coca-Cola's activities in Co-
lumbia, does the TNC carry negative or positive obligations to protect
social, cultural, and economic rights such as the right to organize, an oft-
disapproved practice that by no means has reached customary norm status?
1' Id.
118 MEYER, supra note 51, at 150 (investigation tracking hazards created in devel-
oping world by modem industry finds a growing international trend of which the
accident in Bhopal is indicative due to developing nations attempt to attract western
TNCs).
119 Id. at 151; SAHNI, supra note 3, at 137.
120 BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 58, at 14.
121 MEYER, supra note 51, at 151.
122 In Re: Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in De-
cember, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also SAHNI, supra note 3, al
137-138 (discussing dismissal from federal courts due to forum non conveniens):
MEYER, supra note 51, at 149-153.
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And finally, we look towards Coca-Cola's relationship to India; an emerg-
ing international economic powerhouse which arguably presents an improv-
ing picture of rule of law-how should the responsibilities of a TNC change
according to the country it finds itself in and the relationship the two share?
Transnational Corporation Example III: Rio Tinto
The last question voiced above as well as several others seem best
explored by considering the atrocities which occurred in the 1990s on the
island of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (PNG) where 20,000 civilians
were killed following Rio-Tinto Plc's civil war generating activities.1 23 In
stronger states where domestic regulatory systems are more likely to func-
tion effectively and enforcement to occur 124 it may be sufficient hypotheti-
cally to hold the state responsible for ensuring horizontal as well as vertical
rights enjoyment.125 This method of enforcement does not, of course, miti-
gate the understanding that all actors bear human rights responsibilities, but
it does conform to the current international human rights law framework
reinforcing the primacy of the state in protecting individual rights. The ulti-
mate desirability of this model is questioned most forcefully when it is ap-
plied to weaker states however: those who depend on a TNC's behavioral
self-regulation or in the instances where a state goes substantially further
and participates in active alliances or is complicit in a TNC's violative be-
havior in order to boost essential economic investment. The realities of how
comparable disproportionate political and economic strength mature weak-
ens effective human rights protections under the state-centric model.
Papua New Guinea, which gained independence in 1975, depends
on mining production for two-thirds of its export earnings. 126 In 2005, re-
sidents of the island of Bougainville re-filed an action in U.S. federal courts
attempting to collect civil damages for a large number of grave violations of
customary international law against Australian-based Rio Tinto, a business
group operating copper and gold mines on the island.127 To secure the deal
123 World Factbook, supra note 75.
124 See Stuart Kirsch, Mining and Environmental Human Rights in Papua New
Guinea, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115, 115 (Jedrzej
George Frynas & Scot Pegg eds., 2003) (framing the following history of Ok Tedi
mine and BHP lawsuit by 30,000 indigenous persons in Australia settled out of
court in 1996).
125 Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 937 (vertical application of human rights law
is when the state violates an individuals rights. Horizontal application of human
rights law functions in respect to actions between private actors).
126 World Factbook, supra note 75.
127 Sarei v. Rio Tino, 487 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007).
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for rights to the natural resources, Rio Tinto offered 19.1% of the mine',
profits to the PNG government. 128 The ensuing operations resulted in devas-
tating environmental degradation and poisoning which ruined the health anc
subsidence of the islanders. 29 The company paid lower wages to the Blach
islanders it employer than the White workers it recruited from off the is-
land, and subjected the Black workers to "slave-like" conditions. 30 Aftei
local residents sabotaged the mine protesting the TNC's lack of considera-
tion for the community's concerns and ill-treatment of its residents, Ric
Tinto ordered the government to quell the protests in a bid to reopen the
mines. The ensuing violence and civilian fatalities resulting from the com-
pany's demands triggered a ten year civil war on the island.' 3 ' Rio Tinto
allegedly provided helicopters to transport military troops and facilitate
their operations. 132 Repeated grave violations of humanitarian law and nu-
merous crimes against humanity were committed, including aerial bomb-
ings and burnings of entire villages, thousands of civilians were killed and
systematic acts of cruelty, rape and degrading treatment, often at the behest
of Rio Tinto who was in a superior position to the poverty-stricken and
poorly-governed nation. 133 The U.S. federal district court found that
128 Id. at 1198.
129 Id.; see also Press Release, Hagens, Berman, Sobol, Shapiro LLP, OCEANIC
ISLANDERS USE FEDERAL LAW TO SUE BRITISH MINING GIANT Rio TINTO FOR AL-
LEGED EcOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES (SEPT. 18, 2000), HTTP://FINDAR-
TICLES.COM/P/ARTICLES/MIMOEIN/Is_2000_SEPT_6/Ai_65015334 (LAST VISITED
MAY 1, 2008).
130 Sarei v. Rio Tino, 456 F. 3d at 1197.
131 Id.
132 Hagens, Berman, supra note 129; Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1149 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (plaintiffs alleging Rio Tinto provided helicopters), rev'd,
Sarei v. Rio Tino, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing the dismissal of claims
arguing violations of anti-discrimination norms and war crimes, among others, and
remanded), vacated on other grounds, rehearing en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923.
133 Sarei v. Rio Tino, 487 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007); JOSEPH, supra note 5, at
35 (in analyzing the case, Joseph points out that the plaintiff's made out a proxi-
mate cause claim against Rio Tinto, that is, the relationship between the state and
TNC was such that Rio Tinto's threats to disinvest resulted in the government's
actions. Rio Tinto knew this would be the result, and was in a sufficiently more
powerful position that the state so effectively was responsible for the subsequent
atrocities); World Factbook, supra note 75 (Prime Minster Somare will be the first
government in decades to serve a full five year term); see also Hagens, Berman,
supra note 129 ("By exerting financial pressure, Rio Tinto played an active role in
the demise of the Bougainville's environment and people, as surely as if they'd
pulled the trigger themselves.").
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whether adjudicated pursuant to a "joint action" or via a "control" theory
test for liability under ATCA, there was, assuming all allegations to be true,
sufficient proof that Rio Tinto was the "proximate cause" of the PNG gov-
ernment's actions to withstand a motion to dismiss. 13 4 Threats of disinvest-
ment made by the leadership of Rio Tinto to the poorer PNG combined with
their support of the military campaign and decade long blockade of the
island amounted to effective control of the tortious operations. 13 5
The atrocities committed in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea make
the example one of the less complicated to analyze because of the extremity
of the behavior. The political instability of the nation, economic depen-
dence on the TNC's operations, and the direct involvement and control by
Rio Tinto of PNG's decision-making processes, makes the situation rela-
tively rare on the global scale. The example, however, serves as an exem-
plary analytic tool for addressing the necessity of reconceptualizing
international human rights law in relation to the TNC. As was questioned in
all three corporate examples in this Part but most clearly illustrated by Rio
Tinto's situation, what independent human rights responsibilities should the
TNC have when the state sanctions or desires the human rights violation
itself? Further, does the relationship of the TNC to the state and the popula-
tion factor into the ultimate calculus for ascertaining the extent of human
rights obligations?1 36
PART III: INTERNATIONAL TREATMENT: A BRIEF PRIMER
To contextualize the theories and debate surrounding the future
content of TNCs' legal responsibilities, a brief mapping of the current state
134 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("The court
concludes that, if proved, these facts in combination are sufficient to permit a jury
to find that the acts of PNG are "fairly attributable" to Rio Tinto, that it was "will-
ful participant" in those acts, and/or that it exercised "'control" over them. The
allegations of the war crimes claim are thus sufficient to state a claim and confer
jurisdiction under the ATCA."). The claims were all dismissed because of the polit-
ical questions doctrine. Id. at 1208-1209, rev'd, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F. 3d
1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing the dismissal of certain claims based on the politi-
cal questions doctrine).
135 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1148-1149 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (listing
plaintiffs' claims for purposes of defeating the motion to dismiss which include
particulars of Rio Tinto's threats); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir.
2007) (agreeing with the district court's findings of proximate cause as alleged by
plaintiff's claims for the purposes of defeating motion to dismiss).
136 A similar type inquiry is posited by Alston in a case study regarding Shell Oil
in Nigeria. See Alston, supra note 6, at 11-14.
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of regulation helps the project. The increasing pressure TNCs are feeling to
alter their behavior speaks to not only their growing importance in the
global hierarchy, but also more importantly to their ability to carry interna-
tional personality; that is, to be both the beneficiary, 37 but also a duty-
holder, under international law. It is important to appreciate what structural
changes would be required when theories of direct corporate regulation by
international human rights law are proposed, as well as those which are not.
Detractors of international subjectivity often draw attention to the
significant modifications necessary of the international legal structure if
TNCs are to be accommodated. 138 Additionally, the previously discussed
erosion of state sovereignty generates inertia against modifying the interna-
tional human rights framework in unlikely players, namely, nation-states
themselves. 139
While legitimate considerations, the fears articulated by opponents
often fail to adequately account for the already existing informal market-
based and formal legal-based regulatory mechanisms influencing TNCs'
behavior which have produced something less than the dire consequences
prophesied. Attempts to modify the international arena to accommodate pri-
vate actors as a whole have neither wrought destruction on the existence of
state sovereignty, nor proved impossible to implement, nor conflicted ideo-
logically with the broader human rights discourse by expanding emphasis
and scrutiny to a broader range of players than solely states. 40 As tracing
the various modes of non-state actor regulation suggests, the more produc-
tive process for integrating these considerations is not by invoking them as
definitive insurmountable obstacles, but by utilizing them to inform and
guide future structural and policy changes. The momentum towards direct
137 As mentioned prior, TNCs are already beneficiaries and holders of limited en-
forceable rights under certain trade and investment frameworks. JAGERS, supra
note 47.
138 See, e.g., United States Council for International Business, UN to Review Pro-
posed Code on Human Rights for Business, Mar. 5, 2004, http://www.uscib.org/
index.asp?documentlD=2846 (last visited May 1, 2008) ("The major problem is
that the code would represent a fundamental shift in responsibility for protecting
human rights - from governments to private actors, including companies - effec-
tively privatizing the enforcement of human rights laws.").
139 See Carlos Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under In-
ternational Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 948-958 (2005).
140 Henkin, supra note 31, at 5 (the human rights movement following WWII
caused a major "rent" in state sovereignty as we have come to understand it, but
despite this development, state sovereignty is alive and well entering the twenty
first century).
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regulation of the transnational corporate form under an international human
rights framework requires alterations of the system but not ones of such a
radical nature as to render impossible or unfavorable the attempted transfor-
mation, in contrast to opponents' insinuations. Already a number of non-
state actor entities have been located within the international scheme and
have acquired direct hard-law obligations without destabilizing the state-
centric model or diffusing the state's human rights responsibilities.
Section I Non-legal Forms of Accountability
Upfront it should be noted that the legal world does not hold a
monopoly over the discussion of human rights and corporate behavior. Ac-
tually, up until this point in time the primary mode of administering censure
or imposing obligations on TNCs has been through various market-based
systems of pressure such as public campaigns, niche competition develop-
ment, socially-conscious investing tactics, and other non-legal strategies. 14'
The construction of positive obligations is particularly well formulated in
non-legal histories as corporations responded to, and even capitalized on,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) adept use of media campaigns pro-
moting human rights values in the general populace. The recent prolifera-
141 See generally, Lance Compa & and Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Doing Busi-
ness in China and Latin America: Developments in Comparative and International
Labor Law: Enforcing International Labor Rights through CORPORATE CODES OF
CONDUCT, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1995); Sean D. Murphy, Essay in
Honor of Oscar Schachter: Taking Multinational CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389,391-403 (2005); Simon
Webley, The Nature and Value of Internal Codes of Ethics, in HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 107,
107-113 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (UK companies with voluntary codes of con-
duct rose from 18% to 57%); Alex Wawaryk, Regulating Transnational Corpora-
tions through Corporate Codes of Conduct, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 53-73 (Jedrzej George Frynas & Scott Peggs eds., 2003) (ana-
lyzing four types of codes which have been attempted; the most common form is the
voluntary self-adapted internal model); see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate
Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mer-
catoria, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 180-187 (Philip Alston
ed., 2005) (the rise of socially conscious investing, NGO campaigns, certification
formulas, shareholder pressure etc. has developed a market-based regime of regula-
tion for human rights); See, e.g., FABIENNE FORTANIER & MARIA MAHER, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 5 (OECD, 2001), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/48/1906135.pdf (since the late 80s a growth in
socially conscious investing has culminated in 13% of the total investment market
by 1999 in the United States).
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tion of NGO corporate accountability campaigns has heavily influenced
consumer behavior, forcing business groups to confront the dangers of in-
fringing upon human rights, and the potential profitability in some instances
even of actively promoting them. 142
Non-legal mechanisms, most prominent of which are the now ubiq-
uitous voluntarily adopted internal codes of conduct, 143 have long shared a
symbiotic relationship with international legal objectives. Though primarily
in response to financial concerns, TNCs have also been partially influenced
by legal instruments and maneuvers at the international level. For example,
the promulgation of several non-binding legal instruments addressing TNC
responsibilities has affected TNCs' own normative ideologies, most notably
by shaping their internal voluntary codes of conduct.144 Conversely, these
numerous voluntary codes have influenced the development of a set of
emerging duty standards for TNCs 145 or have, on occasion, inspired innova-
tive litigation at the domestic level for the vindication of international rights
142 Steinhardt, supra note 141, at 180-187; WORKING PARTY OF THE TRADE COM-
MIT-TEE, CODES OF CORPORATE CONDUCT-AN EXPANDED REVIEW OF THEIR CON-
TENT 11-14 (OECD, 2000) [hereinafter CODES OF CORPORATE CONDUCT], available
at http://applil .oecd.org/olis/1999doc.nsf/cl6431elb3f24cacl2569faOO5dld99/
cl2568d1006e0lb9c12568f70035dd97/$FILE/00078855.PDF (for example, while
most voluntary ethics codes restricted themselves to compliance with law for envi-
ronmental regulation, proactive measures included development of environmentally
friendly products and services, exerting influence on partners, contractors and sup-
pliers, conumitments to sustainable development, and considering community con-
cems. Labor rights are also significantly dealt with in most codes, though they tend
to adhere to minimal standards and forgo guaranteeing unionizations rights). The
Body Shop is probably best known for these business tactics. The TNC has codi-
fied its commitments from topics ranging from animal rights, to environmental and
sustainable development initiatives, to human rights-including a commitment to
abide by all the principles enshrined in the UDHR including screening suppliers to
ensure they do likewise. The Body Shop, http://www.thebodyshopinternational.
com/Values+and+Campaigns/Our+Values/Defend+Human+Rights/Home.htm (last
visited May 1, 2008).
143 See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 954-955 (companies include: Adidas,
Nike, The Gap, Reebok, Levi Strauss & Co., Royal Dutch Shell, BP, and Rio
Tinto); Webley, supra note 141, at 109; CODES OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra
note 142.
'44 Steinhardt, supra note 141, at 184 (drawing substance from i.e., UDHR and
ILO conventions).
145 See, e.g., Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 959 (helping shape the Draft UN
Norms).
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concepts. 146 As noted, voluntary codes of ethics or conduct are also largely
adopted in response to non-governmental organization and consumer action
campaigns. 147 Hitherto the most effective tool in modern times, consumer
awareness campaigns and grass-roots pressure has forced a number of cor-
porations to attempt improving their practices. 148 With that said however,
there are several noticeable weaknesses in depending solely on internal vol-
untary regulation or other informal market-based strategies, though public
pressure as a whole most certainly influences TNCs' human rights behav-
ior.149 First, there exist no methods of legal enforcement for voluntary codes
and there is an inherent fallacy in allowing a TNC, or any actor, to be the
sole monitor of its own compliance. 150 Second, a philosophical point: why
are natural persons, international organizations, and states subject to inter-
national legal scrutiny, but the TNC permitted to circumvent it? The con-
ception of human right in the modern era places responsibilities on all
entities' 5 ' which have the ability to affect the rights and dignity of the per-
son. That understanding of inherent worth underlies the rationale behind
acknowledging TNC subjectivity under international law in the same man-
ner it validates the subjectivity of all other entities currently governed by
146 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 947, 963-964 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed
539 U.S. 654 (2003) (plaintiff pressed suit against corporation for under California
Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. for false advertising contravening
California's business code and consumer protection laws § 17500 et seq. Part of the
misleading information was Nike's publicized MOU assumed responsibility for
subcontractors violations of labor, environmental, health and safety, and wage/
overtime compliance. The TNC promoted for commercial gain its statements and
documents demonstrating its good behavior).
147 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 12, at 80-82.
148 See Andrew Fagan, Buying right: Consuming ethically and human rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM 115, 115 (Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan eds.,
2006); Steinhard, supra note 152, at 181-187; Tangen, Rudsar & Bergesen, supra
note 66, at 187-189 (public forced Shell to change its policy towards human rights).
149 See, e.g., Wawaryk, supra note 141, at 62-64.
150 Id. (enforcement problems are most common critique); Kinley & Tadaki, supra
note 7, at 955-956; Joseph, supra note 12, at 82-83; BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra
note 58, at 7-9.
151 This has grown to include international organizations like the UN Peace Keep-
ing forces. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Na-
tions, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Lexis 6 (Apr. 11) (granting the organization
standing as a subject of international law to bring claims). In the Nuremberg Char-
ter, Article 9 granted the tribunal competence to declare an organization criminal
status, and Article 10 noted group members could become implicated personally
for their membership. SAHNI, supra note 3, at 52.
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the international human rights framework. The centrality of human dignity
to the formulation of human rights grounds the starting position for all fur-
ther analysis.152
Section II: International Legal Accountability of Non-State Actors
Subsection IIA: Judicial Treatment
To preface, the primary mode by which international human rights
obligations are constructed and enforced is through domestic adoption of
legislation and through the nation's judicial system. 53 To that end, as noted
in the introduction of this Article, most litigation against corporations and
other non-state actors for human rights violations occurs in domestic juris-
dictions.1 54 Pertaining to human rights violations which take place in non-
domestic geographies, the United States' ATCA is particularly worth bear-
ing mention. The ATCA has served as the primary tool for human rights
litigation against TNCs to date. 5 5 Cases against Del Monte, Chevron, Royal
Dutch Shell, Rio Tinto, Talisman Energy, Occidental Petroleum, Eastman
Kodak, Texaco, Exxon, Unocal, Freeport-McMoRan, Coca-Cola, the Gap,
Unocal, and Pfizer have been pursued, among others, with varying degrees
of success. 156
152 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 538-539.
153 BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 58, at 11, 77; see also Reinisch, supra note
6, at 53 (way to secure human rights is to "translate international human rights
guarantees into domestic legal order.").
154 JOSEPH, supra note 5, at 16-17; Reinisch, supra note 6, at 55-56.
155 JoSEPH, supra note 5, at 16-17.
156 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005);
Bowoto v. Chevron, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 63209 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28813 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Sarei v Rio
Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915
(9th Cir. 2001); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.
Dist. Cal. 2005); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16126 (2005);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Beanal i'. Free-
port-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin,
978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-1094 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 393 F. Supp.
2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2005); Does 1 v. The Gap, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25035
(Dist. N. Mariana Islands, 2001); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d
510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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An initial worry surfaced prior to the 2004 Supreme Court Case,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,157 that the use of the ATCA, the United States'
analogue of a universal jurisdiction statute but for non-criminal civil claims
only, would be eliminated as a mode of recourse for aliens seeking redress
for violations of their human rights. The decision in Sosa did not erase the
potential for using the ATCA to serve this aim, despite fearful pre-judgment
speculation, but the decision did partially limit the scope of what constitutes
violations contravening the law of nations for the purposes of the Act. 158 A
full detailed analysis of the various state methods for imposing civil or
criminal accountability is beyond the objectives of this article. 159 Irrespec-
tive of any individual states' potential domestic judicial remedies, the ques-
tion still remains whether the TNC, supranational in character and
interacting with a spectrum of state players who may lack the technical
capacity or political will to enforce human rights standards independently,
157 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that ATCA was a juris-
dictional statute and granted a private cause of action for international law trans-
gressions for aliens).
158 See generally Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d at 1246-1247 (dis-
cussing effects of Sosa on the analysis: "the federal courts are to be "'vigilant door-
keepers" but a modest number of international law violations may pass through.");
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (affirming
refusal to dismiss plaintiff's claims for crimes against humanity, torture, and arbi-
trary arrest and detention despite intervening Sosa decision).
159 Good sources include Sarah Joseph's book looking in depth at the ATCA
named CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra
note 6. On an additional note, examples of corporate accountability for intema-
tional rights violations have also been developed on an ad hoc basis by individual
states within the US. For example, California has legislated a private right of action
for anyone (or their estate) who was forced into labor by the Nazis or their sympa-
thizers and allies for any time between 1929-1945 granting a right to recovery of
compensation against the entity for whom the labour was performed, or its succes-
sor in interest. CAL. CIV. CODE § 354.6 (Deering 2006); see generally Michael
Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts,
34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2001). The same cannot be said for recourse of harms
pertaining to apartheid litigation unfortunately. In Re: South African Apartheid Lit-
igation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("at the least, defendants [cor-
porations] benefited from a system that provided a glut of cheap labor."). The
litigation was merged and dismissed.
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should be subject to the direct supervision of the international human rights
legal regime, and, if so, to what extent?160
Jurisprudentially, the roots of corporate accountability for human
rights violations may be deciphered from the treatment of certain other cate-
gories of non-state actors in international courts since direct litigation
against or on behalf of the corporation has not yet occurred in that arena.
Foreshadowings of corporate liability under international law can
be traced back to the Second World War where the narrower subset of
human rights obligations, those implicating individual criminal culpability,
imposed upon prominent corporate participants for aiding and abetting the
Nazi extermination plan. The material role leading industrialists and their
business activities played in supporting the Nazi regime has been fastidi-
ously documented and was the subject of multiple prosecutorial attempts
following the cessation of hostilities. 161 The behavior of the corporation as
a judicial person was not per se at issue in these trials as the Nuremberg
statute did not authorize jurisdiction over non-natural persons. 162 Rather,
individual criminal accountability was imposed in limited cases of complic-
ity, the leading example being the sentencing of two high-level corporate
officials for supplying Zyklon B, the gas used to kill prisoners in Auschwitz
and other concentration camps, to the Germans with the knowledge the gas
would be used to pursue such an objective. 63 Charges arose from business
160 See Wells & Elias, supra note 51, at 146-148; see also Joseph, supra note 12, at
78; Ratner, supra note 8, at 461; De Schutter, supra note 57, at 237-238; Kinley &
Tadaki, supra note 7, at 938.
161 See generally Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists:
The "Other Schindlers°', 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 173, 181-249 (1995); see
also Beth Stephens, Symposium, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corpora-
tions and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 45-53 (2002); Kyle Rex
Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of prosecuting corporate
officials whose business transactions facilitate war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity, 56 A.F.L. REV. 167, 167-195 (2005).
If you want to indict industrialists who helped to rearm Germany,
you will have to indict your own too. The Opel Werke, for in-
stance, who did nothing but war production, were owned by your
GENERAL MOTORS. Hjalmer Horace Greeley Schacht, Defen-
dant at Int. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
162 JAGERS, supra note 47, at 223.
163 The Zyklon B Case: Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, 1 Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals 93 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946) (Tesch and Weinbacher were
found guilty. The third, Drosihn, was acquitted. The two were sentenced to death
by hanging. The sentences were later confirmed and carried out); see also Jacob-
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practices including the use of enslaved labor, crimes of complicity in geno-
cide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity in connection with
aiding the Nazi efforts. 164 The Tribunal in adjudicating these cases formu-
lated two important conclusions. First, obligations pertaining to particular
per se wrongs existed regardless of the status of the duty bearer, in other
words, individuals in their private capacity and nature bore certain obliga-
tions, regardless of their non-public/state nature.1 65 Second, by imposing
liability on corporate leadership in their individualized capacity for enter-
prise activity, the tribunals took the further step of connecting limited viola-
tive forms of business activity to private, non-state accountability.
Since World War II, international criminal tribunals have extended
principles of liability to non-state actors independent of the state action re-
quirement for certain crimes. The ICTY, for example, severed the state ac-
tion requirement and instead focused on accountability by virtue of de facto
control over a territory when it tried the Serb leader Dusan Tadic for war
crimes and crimes against humanity during the ethnic strife in the former
Yugoslavia.166
The prosecution in its pre-trial brief argues that under inter-
national law crimes against humanity can be committed on
behalf of entities exercising de facto control over a particu-
lar territory but without international recognition or formal
status of a de jure state, or by a terrorist group or organiza-
tion. The defense does not challenge this assertion, which
conforms with recent statements regarding crimes against
humanity. 16 7
son, supra note 161, at 193-195; SAHNI, supra note 3, at 60; Ratner, supra note 8,
at 477-478.
164 See Jacobson, supra note 161; Stephens, supra note 161.
165 See Steinhardt, supra note 141, at 196-198.
166 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- l-T, Opinion and Judgment, 654 (May 7,
1997). The ICTR extends liability for crimes against humanity to times of peace,
eliminating any nexus requirement to armed conflict. See SAHNI, supra note 3, at
63; the importance of de facto control has emerged due to the changing nature of
armed conflict since WWII. Increasingly, internal armed conflict is the paradigm,
and groups such as the SPLA, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and FARC in Colombia
are exercising de facto control over regions and their role and responsibilities need
to be considered in the international human rights regime. See Alston, supra note 6,
at 18-19.
167 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 654, Opinion and Judgment.
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This extension proves useful conceptually, if somewhat less-so
technically, because it extends liability for grave violations of human rights
norms to entities beyond those classified as the official state, and does so to
entities acting in their independent capacity not only when they work in
conjunction with the state. It reinforces the understanding that human rights
emanate from the individual and concern all those who come into contact
with his or her person and may violate those rights-they are not merely a
set of affairs arising from the citizen-state relationship. The text of the deci-
sion also indicates that certain non-state actor organizations can have inde-
pendent or de facto control over a territory and assume extra responsibilities
because of that position. Though Tadic referenced crimes committed during
certified armed conflict and not during the regular course of daily activities,
the concept of independent control produces helpful theoretical grounding
for developing the narrative and language of TNC obligations. These two
themes running in the Tadic case, extension of liability beyond state actors
and the inspection of the relevant actors relationship to the population, as-
sist in bridging the steps towards configuring TNC subjectivity under inter-
national law. Though extremes are not common, relationships between the
civilian population and the corporation have at times taken on attributes of
non-state actor de facto control, Rio Tinto being exemplary for purposes of
this hypothetical. At other times a more nuanced assessment shows similar
aspects and relationships of non-state actor control over the population
within the borders of a given sectors or service as privatization is stressed in
economic development practices.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also extended standing
to a number of non-state actors to pursue civil remedies for human rights
violations through the international system. The past ability of the interna-
tional structure to evolve and accommodate different manners of actors
proves useful when assessing its future capabilities of integrating TNCs as
subjects under its jurisdiction. The question in the Reparations for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case was whether the United
Nations, as an organization, had the ability to bring an international claim
for reparations against the responsible state if its agent was harmed in the
performance of his duties while stationed therein. 168 The United Nations
inquired as to both its own recompenses and on behalf of the victim and to
those entitled through him.169 The ICJ found that the UN could seek repara-
tions on its own behalf for breach of obligations owed to it from all states,
168 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Lexis 6 (Apr. 11).
169 Id. at 1.
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whether member of the United Nations or not.170 In regards to seeking repa-
rations on behalf of the victim or his beneficiaries, the ICJ found that the
UN Charter mandated certain activities of the organization necessary for
effectively carrying out its difficult mission. Because of this condition, the
agents of the organization were entitled to assurance of certain protections
while assisting in fulfilling those duties. 7 ' The ICJ instituted a practical
test, finding that the organization had the "capacity to exercise functional
protection in respect of its agents" due to its mandate 172 and therefore inher-
ited an objective set of rights and obligations regardless of whether the state
in question was a member of the UN. The ICJ decision invested the U.N., a
supranational actor, with objective international personality under interna-
tional human rights law. 17 Though a composite of its member states, the
integration of the U.N. into the international human rights legal framework
reflects the system's capacity to recognize and enforce obligations against
entities other than solely the state without the system's complete fragmenta-
tion or collapse.
Regional bodies have been imposing human rights obligations di-
rectly on non-state actors for several decades. The European Court of Jus-
tice for example in Walrave and Koch v. Association of Union Cyclists, the
court held that limiting anti-discrimination obligations to the public sphere
would risk undermining the prohibitions entirely.' 74 The court reinforced
the concept that private corporations bore human rights responsibilities di-
rectly in Defrenne v. Sabena. The court again noted that, while establishing
judicial enforcement of non-discrimination rights was an obligation of the
state's, the legal duty to pay men and women equally continued to apply
directly to the employer, irrespective of whether they are a private or public
entity. 175 The orders stemming from these adjudications have been directly
applied to the TNC without requirement of the state acting as an intermedi-
ary. The ability of regional legal systems to accommodate private actors
without exponentially undermining the state's sovereignty or responsibility
for promoting human rights calls into question the assumption that the inter-
national framework cannot do likewise.
170 Id. at 4.
171 Id. at 6.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 7.
174 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cycliste
intemationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, 17, 19-20.
175 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Socit6 anonyme belge de navigation a6r-
ienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 22, 38, 39, 40.
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Additionally, international non-human rights legal bodies have
managed the task of integrating non-state actors into their structures. The
subjectivity of the corporation as a separate legal entity under various do-
mestic and international schemes is cognizable in practically every na-
tion.1 7 6 The universality of that subjectivity has caused the TNC to benefit
from access to judicial processes at the international level. Investment and
trade organizations such as the IMF, WB, and WTO have created enforce-
ment mechanisms which sometimes provide direct recourse for TNCs suf-
fering violations of their recognized rights against foreign states. 77
Subsection IIB: Legislative Treatment
International legal regimes in other sectors have implemented sys-
tems imposing obligations on corporations through treaty-based agree-
ments. While the various treaties leave enforcement up to the domestic
judicial system, the obligations and liabilities are directly imposed upon the
corporation as an independent duty-bearer. Corporations which violate en-
vironmental standards, for example, are liable for civil damages under sev-
eral treaties including the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy, the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Nuclear Ships, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Nuclear Damages, the 1969 International Convention on Civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage and the attached 1984 Protocol, the 1971
Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime
Carriage of Nuclear Material, and the 1976 Convention on Civil Liability
176 See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Lim-
ited (Second Phase), 1970 I.C.J. Lexis 2, 7 (1970) (the court rationalized that inter-
national law recognizes the institutions of municipal (state) law, and that under
state law the company's rights are firmly distinct from shareholder rights. The com-
pany is endowed with legal personality of its own); see also Michael Addo, The
Corporation as a Victim of Human Rights Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STAN-
DARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 187, 192
(Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (most legal jurisdictions recognize certain entitle-
ments of the corporation); see generally ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT THOMP-
SON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR
LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (FAFO INSTITUTE,
2006) (many states go even further and have domestic regimes that acknowledge
corporations and other judicially created persons can be liable for criminal viola-
tions), available at www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
177 Reinisch, supra note 6, at 85; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 946: Aderman
& Kariyawasam, supra note 48, at 181; Ratner, supra note 8, at 488.
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for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation
of Seabed Mineral Resources.178
In the human rights field, several international organs have at-
tempted to move beyond the restricted discourse of individual criminal lia-
bility to discuss and articulate TNC obligations for a broader set of human
rights. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were adopted in 1976.179
They function in a non-binding fashion. To encourage implementation and
observance the Guidelines employ a consultation mechanism which re-
ceives complaints and in return "clarifies" the guidelines for all invested
parties including the state, NGOs, and corporations. Clarifications are not
legally-enforceable, though state parties signatory to the document commit
to promoting the standards enumerated in the instrument and the state is
obligated to set up the prerequisite complaint procedures. 180 The instrument
targets both the state and corporations in its language, although it retains
general principles of international law in privileging the prerogative of the
national government in setting local standards. The OECD Guidelines seek
to pressure TNCs into adhering to those local standards. However, the style
in which the Guidelines focus on the state and the corporation in requesting
the positive facilitation of its contents constructs the foundation for future
OECD directives targeted solely at the TNC in its own separate capacity. 181
In 2000, a revised version of the OECD formulated language directly ad-
dressing TNCs separately. 82 To date, thirty OECD states have accepted the
instrument and an additional eight non-state members have adopted it. 183
The Guidelines were last updated in 2000 and, despite some complaints
regarding their ineffectiveness, 184 advocates argue that several positive con-
sequences have resulted, not the least being that international instruments
178 Ratner, supra note 8, at 479-480.
179 Joachim Karl, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
89, 90 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999).
180 Id. at 89; CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 202.
181 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 202.
182 BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 58, at 66.
183 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 203.
184 See, e.g., Huner, supra note 64, at 202 (general malaise in the mid 90s); Kinley
& Tadaki, supra note 7, at 950-951.
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were directly speaking to TNCs regarding their duties to promote a broader
spectrum of human rights. 185
Another quasi-legislative international attempt at regulating TNC
behavior is the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Tripartite Declara-
tion of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises. The instrument
was adopted in 1977 and amended in 2000.186 Similar to the OECD guide-
lines, it is non-binding, but is different in nature in that it initially directly
spoke to TNCs as independent entities as well as states, labor organizations,
and employers' associations, asking all parties for certain minimum rights
commitments. 187 It incorporates all the rights listed in the UDHR and the
two International Covenants, one for Civil and Political Rights and the
other for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 8 8 The instrument also fo-
cuses heavily on employee labor condition rights. 189 Though its larger sig-
natory base may garner it a certain amount of authority as a rights document
edging towards international customary norms, its current enforcement
mechanisms resemble in some capacity those of the OECD clarification
procedures and its periodic review of member states through a surveying
process has culminated in few significant changes. 190
In 1999 then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan, noting the rising
strength of corporations and the inevitability of economic globalization,
asked the business world directly to voluntarily enact and promote the UN
Global Compact (launched in 2000), which contained a set of universally-
agreed upon principles fundamentally grounded in three human rights docu-
ments: the UDHR, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work (1997), and the Rio Declaration of the UN Conference on Environ-
ment and Development. 91 The Global Compact has gone considerably be-
185 See generally, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 58, at 67-68 (espousing posi-
tives); CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 207 (right to organize and collectively bargain
recognized).
186 International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concern-
ing Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy pg 1, Feb. 2000, available at http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf.
187 Id. ("Hereby approves all the following Declaration.... and invites govern-
ments of States Members of the ILO, the employers' and workers' organizations
concerned and the multinational enterprises operating in their territories to observe
the principles embodied therein.").
188 Id. at 3.
189 BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 58, at 69.
190 Id.; CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 216-218.
191 The Global Compact also incorporates the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption. United Nations Global Compact, Ten Principles, http://www.unglobal
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yond any prior legislative attempt at expanding the breadth of corporate
responsibilities for human rights. Two types of obligations are spelled out;
firstly, not to instigate violations of human rights directly; and second, not
to be complicit in such violations. 192 The Global Compact is revolutionary
in that it is directed solely at corporations. It begins extending obligations
by linking them to the "spheres of influence" of a corporation, encompass-
ing not only employees, but also communities outside of the work place and
the broader good. Finally, the complicity factor has been interpreted as
affecting the TNC's relationship to third-party abuses and the TNC's re-
sponsibility not to benefit from such actions. 193
In August 2003, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights sought to formulate a comprehensive answer to the
question of TNC responsibility. It adopted the UN Norms on the Responsi-
bility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights (Draft Norms). 194 The then Commission on
Human Rights (now Human Rights Council) did not adopt the norms, there-
fore they remain only illustrative. 195 The Draft Norms are an attempt at
creating the first non-voluntary legally-binding instrument directed at TNCs
and other corporate entities. However, the instrument delineates between
TNCs and other business participants for the purpose of distinguishing
well-capitalized and powerful enterprises. 196 In order to respond to the cen-
trality in international human rights law of the state, the Draft Norms also,
though specifically targeting corporate actors, include a "savings clause"
which reinforces that the Norms may not be construed as altering the broad
obligations of the state to protect and promote human rights.19 7
compact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited May 1, 2008);
see also Asbjom Eide, Globalization and the Human Rights Agenda: The Petro-
leum Industry at Crossroads, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY 25, 39
(Asbjorn Eide et. al. eds., 2000).
192 United Nations Global Compact, supra note 204, at "Human Rights," http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/humanRights.html.
193 Id.; see CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 218-225.
194 UN Draft Norms, supra note 8.
195 Sorrell, supra note 18, at 285; CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 226.
196 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 227.
197 UN Draft Norms, supra note 8, at § A. General Obligations; see also Sorell,
supra note 20, at 287; CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 229; but see John Ruggie, UN
Secretary General's Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Open-
ing Statement to the United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva, Sept. 25,
2006), http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-statement-to-UN-Human-
Rights-Council-25-Sep-2006.pdf, at 3 (major concern with the Norms is their
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The Draft Norms adopt the "spheres of influence" concept from the
Global Compact, extending the reach of duty beyond direct employees and
other persons traditionally associated with the TNC. Additionally, the Draft
Norms spell out a series of negative and positive obligations, requiring
TNCs to "promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law." 198
Under this language, TNCs resemble the state to an extent, with the differ-
ence being the limiting factor of their "sphere of influence." Enforcement
mechanisms drafted to implement the norms necessarily assume a different
nature of regulation due to the private character of the party as compared to
the state. Requirements include entering the Norms into every contract or
other arrangement, making them enforceable under an international contract
law regime. 199
PART IV: CONTEMPORARY THEORIES
Several worthwhile attempts at further conceptualizing the position-
ality of TNCs in the international human rights legal framework have been
formulated and bear considering.
Professor Ratner sees TNCs located in three potential power rela-
tionships which implicate human rights enjoyment. First, the desire of de-
veloping nations to attract foreign investment can lead to de facto control of
a given territory by a TNC. 200 Second, regardless of the TNC's position in
foreign investment, a problematic government might still use resources ob-
tained from transacting with the TNC to further its own human rights
abuses.20 1 Lastly, as corporations progressively internationalize, they be-
come increasingly independent of state governmental controls. 202 With the
advent of these relationships, the desirability of imposing regulation on the
TNC as a separate entity under international law becomes increasingly ap-
parent. The additional inherent difference between the TNC and the natural
person's ability to access resources, as well as avoid state regulation, and
the difference in ability to harm human dignity, buttress the conclusion that
more than a mere subset of individual criminal liability should be imposed
poorly thought-out theoretical underpinnings and their potential threat to develop-
ing nation democracy).
198 UN Draft Norms, supra note 8, at § A. General Obligations.
199 Id. at 233.
200 Ratner, supra note 8, at 462 (giving example of Freeport-McMoRan in Papua,
Indonesia).
201 Id. (giving example of apartheid).
202 Id. at 463.
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on the TNC.2 3 When confronted with the question that international law is
functionally state-centric, Ratner argues that the international law has al-
ready recognized human rights duties on non-state actors, including rebel
militias, with the purpose that such groups, analogous to their governmental
counterparts, must respect the fundamental human rights of those under
their control.20 4 We have also accepted the notion of non-state actor duties
born by the individuals through a criminal law system which has held pri-
vate actors wholly responsible at the international level for agreed-upon
crimes such as genocide.
Professor Ratner then proposes a methodology for deriving the
norms of corporate responsibility. He suggests four separate aspects which
must be considered. In adjudging the extent of the TNC's responsibilities,
one must look at the relationship the TNC has to the government, 205 the
nexus it has to the affected populations, 20 6 the substantive rights at issue, 20 7
and attribution principles pertaining to the corporate structure. As a fifth
likely consideration, Professor Ratner considers the element of fault, though
determines that the mens rea requirement would in all likelihood be pre-
scribed by the nature of the judicial proceeding. 208
The third step of the theory, the substantive right at issue segment,
begs deeper inquiry as the philosophical underpinnings of the entire calcu-
lation lie in a trifurcated analysis proposed for determining the extent of the
TNC's responsibilities regarding any one particular right. First, one must
differentiate between essentially public and private rights-in other words,
those that only the state has the capability of violating, like the right to
cross-examination in criminal trials, versus actions which are in the purview
203 Id. at 494-495.
204 Id. at 466-467.
205 Id. at 496-505 (the TNC could either be the mirror image if the state, consid-
ered a governmental agency when it is exercising quasi-state authority, could be
complicit with government actions similar to the individual criminal law analysis,
or perhaps be found liable under a 'commander' liability doctrine for those cases
where governmental forces, etc. maintain private security of the TNC).
206 Id. at 506-509 (the TNC has responsibilities in 'concentric circles' like ripples
in a pond. As the TNC's influence diminishes on the population in question, the
scope of its responsibilities diminishes towards that population as well).
207 Id. at 511- 517 (there are several main components to this step which will be
discussed in the paper. The key consideration in the formulation of this step is
circumscribing a set of responsibilities which factor in the unique nature of the
TNC as compared to the state).
208 Id. at 522-524 (whether administrative, criminal, or civil etc.).
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of every actor, such as cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. 20 9 Re-
garding the former, private non-state actors may only be complicit and can-
not bear the direct obligation.210 Second, Professor Ratner argues that it is
imperative to balance the interests of the TNC with the rights at stake of the
person. The balancing of interests between the state and the individual oc-
curs in the question of justifiable derogation, and an analogous balancing
must occur in relation to the TNC and the individual. 211 An example of this
is freedom of opinion. Through a balancing of interests the TNC may per-
missibly terminate an employee for publicly criticizing the company,
though is barred from disciplining the worker for critiquing the govern-
ment.212 Lastly, beyond merely prohibiting certain action by the TNC which
would violate human rights, the extent that the TNC must take positive
measures to help the population realize their rights would depend on its
nexus to the affected population and the necessity of such actions in order
to comply with its negative duties. The more effective control it has over
the territory, the more its responsibilities would mirror a state's
obligations. 2 13
Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki replicate certain elements of
Professor Ratner's argument but extrapolate more specific duties and argue
for more positive rights obligations to be required of the TNC.214 The au-
thors agree that to ignore the fundamental character difference between the
TNC and the state is erroneous and, similar to Ratner, believe a balancing
test of the TNC's rights with the individual's human rights should occur.215
However, the increased position of the TNC requires some form of ex-
tended responsibility under international law.2 16
Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki break down their system of
analysis into two levels. First, they look at how duties apply directly to the
behavior of the TNC ("self-reflexive" responsibilities) and what obligations
the TNC has to prevent others from harming human rights ("third party"
responsibilities).2 17 The authors adopt a similar "concentric circles" of influ-
ence paradigm for defining the scope of responsibilities to the population in
209 Id. at 511-512.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 513-515 (similar to states, certain rights would never be allowed to be
derogated from).
212 Id. at 514.
213 Id. at 516-517 (as a practical matter TNC only have negative duties).
214 Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7.
215 Id. at 961, 967-968; Ratner, supra note 8, at 494-495.
216 Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 938.
217 Id. at 963.
TRACING THE CONTOURS
question,218 but seemingly insinuate a similar form of assessment regarding
the TNC's obligations to attempt to influence third-parties. Thus, if the
TNC has significant influence in its contractual relationship with subsidiar-
ies, subcontractors, suppliers, etc., it should reasonably be expected to en-
courage those entities to respect the human rights in question. 219 The fact
that providing protections where others have not or lobbying others to pro-
tect human rights which have historically been public functions does not
disturb the authors. They note that the privatization of public functions has
been a hallmark of economic globalization, and TNCs have become accus-
tomed to exercising these types of power regularly, particularly in develop-
ing countries. 220 Their new roles give TNCs considerable ability to affect
public and private conditions. 22 1
The authors then work through a series of substantive rights and
play out their theoretical conception as it applies to the situation. They note
that some rights are beyond the purview of the direct obligations of TNCs
by nature of their excessively public nature, such as the right to asylum and
nationality.22 2 However, some rights traditionally conceived of as public
may be reworked to circumscribe the private nature of the TNC, such as the
right to education, which could entail the responsibility to curtail child labor
use or provide financial assistance to children to attend school.223 The au-
thors apply their self-reflexive and third-party responsibility model onto
two sets of rights, "core rights," which are fundamental universal norms
such as the right to life, liberty and bodily integrity, and "direct impact
rights," which belong to the constituencies most directly impacted by the
TNCs actions.224 To demonstrate one break-down, the authors develop the
rights of association and collective bargaining, noting that this widely-rec-
ognized freedom is the cornerstone of the basic rights of workers. 225 Yet,
TNCs are often reluctant to give effect to that right, especially in develop-
ing countries. The authors propose that TNCs are obligated to refrain from
discrimination, have the positive obligation of providing the employees in-
formation, and have third-party obligations to protect that right from abuse,
even if they must exert their influence on a hostile host country. 226 As an
218 Id. at 963-964; Ratner, supra note 8, at 506-509.
219 Kinely & Tadaki, supra note 8, at 964-965.
220 Id. at 965.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 967.
223 Id. at 966.
224 Id. at 968.
225 Id. at 976.
226 Id.
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alternative, the TNC should facilitate other forms of employee organizing
and participation such as single-issue committees. 227 They should influence
agents and partners to do likewise.2 28
Both Professor Ratner and Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki
have articulated a central concept that the framework of analysis must con-
sider several different relationships, both with respect to the population and
to the state. The two theories also delineate, though in a somewhat different
manner, between essentially public and private duties-in other words, sets
of responsibilities that may only be born by the state. These two compo-
nents are essential for locating the TNC in a larger international framework
which still invests in the supremacy of the state. The danger of allowing
private entities equal positionality in the structure threatens the rights to
democratic self-determination itself. The conceptualization espoused by
these two theories for a type of middle ground between the individual and
the state allows for a relativist locating of the TNC in what Professor An-
drew Clapham theorizes as "acquiring rights and duties through capacity
rather than subjectivity. 229
Professor Clapham proffers an alternative to the rhetoric of subjec-
tivity under international law. Instead, the language of subjectivity gives
way to the idea of "capacity," or whether the non-state actor can acquire
rights and obligations under the international system. 230 Professor Clapham
argues there is nothing literally in the way of endowing non-state actors
with the capacity or legal personality to have these sets of features, and it is
then only a short leap to provide apposite enforcement mechanisms.23 1 We
have already seen such a process take place in the example of international
organizations. As the Reparations for Individuals in the Service of the
United Nations case shows, the non-state actor has the "capacity to bring an
international claim;" the organization has rights and obligations, and a large
measure of international personality which is different from those of mem-
ber states. 23 2 Thus, vesting the TNC with capacity or legal personality for
the purposes of enforcing obligations under international law does not nec-
essarily require threatening the supremacy of the sovereign state in interna-
tional law. The problem, Professor Clapham argues, is the issue of nation-
states fearing this loss of their sovereignty, rather than a legal problem, for a
227 Id. at 977.
228 Id.
229 See CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 70-73.
230 Id. at 70; see also JAGERS, supra note 47, at 22-35.
231 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 70.
232 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered while in the Service of the United Na-
tions, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Lexis 6, 3-4 (Apr. 11).
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number of humanitarian law and human rights treaties have imposed obli-
gations on non-state actors when not doing so would defeat the focus on
victims and their rights.
Professor Ralph Steinhardt also argues that subjectivity under inter-
national law does not serve as a barrier through both historical and current
models. Professor Steinhardt argues that an artificial distinction between the
realms of the public (human rights) and private (corporate activities)
molded about the state-centric international legal model results in a misin-
terpretation of corporate and human rights interactions unreflective of con-
temporary reality and inhibitive of future productive legal discourse. 233
Professor Steinhardt looks at the four predominant regimes through which
institutional change has been effectuated. Corporations have become obli-
gation-bearers under the international human rights regime for negative and
positive responsibilities through market-based regimes, domestic regulatory
mechanisms, domestic civil liability schemes, and an emerging regime of
international regulatory attempts. 234 He argues, the process and substance of
the emerging rights-based behavior created by these interactive regimes
points towards a modern adaptation of lex mercatoria, or, the "medieval
law merchant. '23 5 The lex mercatoria was a normative regime which sought
to internationalize commercial transacting standards through the enforce-
ment efforts of the entrepreneurs themselves in 15th and 16th century Eu-
rope as interstate merchant trade increased and the promulgation of
standards became essential. 236 The norms generated from the structure be-
came codified in both national and international trade and commercial law
instruments over the years. 237 Steinhardt sees a similar model possible under
current trends. While direct regulation has not occurred, TNCs are self-
233 Steinhardt, supra note 141, at 177.
234 Id. at 180-220.
235 Id. at 221; see generally Charles Donahue, Jr., The Empirical and Theoretical
Underpinnings of the Law Merchant: Medieval and Early Modern LEX MER-
CATORIA: An Attempt at the probatio diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 21 (2004); Emily
Kadens, The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant: Or-
der within Law, Variety within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Merchant
Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 39 (2004); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, The Empirical and
Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant: LEX MERCATORIA-Hoist with
Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 67 (2004). The existence of the amorphous Lex
Mercateria in history and modernity remains debated.
236 Steinhardt, supra note 141, at 222-223.
237 Id. at 224.
2008
182 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14
regulating in the moment and there is nothing to prevent the translation of
those business practices into international law over time. 238
Professor Ratner reinforces both Professors Clapham and Stein-
hardt's arguments, noting that we have in reality subjected a number of
non-state actors to "subjectivity" under international human rights law, and
the TNC is not different in this manner. The introduction of certain non-
state actors into the scheme has not destroyed sovereignty. Rather, the dis-
tinguishing feature, he notes, between the TNC and other non-state actors is
the systemic access to resources unavailable to the natural person, and the
increased potential to affect the enjoyment of rights in both a positive and
negative way. 239
Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki build on Ratner's hypothesis.
Their movement into positive obligations based on the very nature of the
TNC's increased power seems preferable when considering, as Professor
Philip Alston notes, the increased privatization of previously public essen-
tial services such as health care and social services, not to mention the in-
creased privatization of security forces. 240
The above theories cycle back to the initial consideration of the
nature of human dignity perhaps best captured in the defense of
Drittwirkung by Professor Nicola Jagers. 241 That is, they all argue for the
existence of a form of horizontal application of rights. 242 The nature of
human rights-that they are vested in each individual as a human being in
the Kantian sense-militates against recognizing only violations vis-A-vis
the state. As Professor Jagers notes, merely because enforcement mecha-
238 Id. at 224-225.
239 See Ratner, supra note 8, at 466-467, 494-495.
240 Alston, supra note 6, at 9-10, 17 (privatization of security and other public
functions such as social welfare systems and health care have placed private actors
in positions historically associated with the state and greatly affecting the realiza-
tion of human rights).
241 An example of Drittwirkung (indirect version) in the International Bill of
Rights; the non-discrimination obligations such as those imposed by International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are sometimes interpreted as
prohibiting discrimination by private parties as well as state actors. The Human
Rights Committee's General Comments reinforces this interpretation by noting its
desire to be informed of violations committed by private persons as well as state
entities. Subsequent international instruments are even more explicit about the flow
of non-discrimination obligations between private parties, though all of these are
enforced indirectly by holding the state accountable for failing to secure the rights
of the individual against other individuals. JAGERS, supra note 47, at 51-53.
242 Id. at 36-37.
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nisms do not currently exist at the international level at this time, it should
not be read as meaning that human rights responsibilities do not lie between
private parties. 243 Professor Jagers traces decisions by both the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
which reify the concept of private obligations. 244 The IACHR in its now
well-recognized Velasquez Rodriguez case, for example, emphasized that
states have an obligation to prevent human rights violations which are not
attributable in any capacity to the state.245 The reasoning exhibited in the
cases Professor Jagers tracks articulates and affirms the existence of viola-
tive capabilities intrinsic to the private individual, even if international en-
forcement mechanisms do not currently target such types of transgressive
parties directly.
However, what is currently missing from the international frame-
work is the concept of direct Drittwirkung-the ability for the individual to
bring claims against the private party in its own right.246 Generally, the in-
ternational space currently allows only support of indirect Drittwirkung, or
the ability to hold the state responsible for violations of private parties
against each other's human rights when the violation is the result of negli-
gence or impropriety by the state.247
The one criticism that figures most prominently in Professor
Ratner's and Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki's arguments is the as-
sumption by each that an inherent component of conceptualizing TNC re-
sponsibility boundaries requires a balancing test of the TNC's private
objective. 248 Both sets of authors neglect to consider the rationale behind
this ability to derogate. The balancing of the state's rights with the individ-
ual's in times when derogation may be acceptable is theoretically justified
under the auspices of necessity for securing the greater good. The curtailing
of individual rights can only legally occur when it is necessary for the pro-
curement of the broader community's human rights.249 At no point in the
243 Id. at 37-38.
244 Id. at 147-157.
245 VELASQUEZ RODRIGUEZ V. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, at
172 (Jul. 29, 1988).
246 Id. at 37.
247 Id. at 38, 46; Vazquez, supra note 139, at 937-938 (only indirect Drittwirkung
possible under ECHR).
248 Ratner, supra note 8, at 513-515; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 967-968.
249 See Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 29, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5/
Add. 1, para. 2, 3, et. al. (Apr. 18, 2002) (exploration of times when derogation may
occur and defining the boundaries of "threat to the life of the nation"); Oren Gross,
"Once More unto the Breach": The Systemic Failure of Applying the European
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equation do private considerations between equal parties supply reasoning
for infringing on human rights. That is not to say that the TNC, as a legal
person, has no rights. It merely means that the considerations when defining
the scope of its human rights responsibilities as a private player, both nega-
tive and positive, must revolve around a different set of questions, such as
the private/public distinction both sets of authors illustrate, and perhaps
even those rights which we find indispensable to the facilitation of the cor-
porate form, few of which implicate heavily the human rights responsibili-
ties explored throughout this article.
PART V: THE SHAPE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
Extending direct duty-bearing capacity under international human
rights law to the TNC is required by contemporary exigencies 250 and the
theoretical underpinnings of modem human rights. 251 As evidenced by leg-
islative and judicial histories extending human rights obligations to non-
state actors, imposing such responsibilities upon TNCs is technically possi-
ble.252 Economic globalization, with all of the positive effects it has and
may in the future engender, has through its perpetuation changed the rela-
tionship between states and non-state actors.253 Procedures advocated by
Convention on HUMAN RIGHTS to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT'L L.
437, 459-460 (1998):
A state party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
pursuant to Article 4 (hereinafter called "DEROGATION measures")
only when faced with a situation of exceptional and actual or im-
minent danger which threatens the LIFE OF THE NATION. A threat
to the LIFE OF THE NATION is one that: affects the whole of the
population and either the whole or part of the territory of the
State, and threatens the physical integrity of the population, the
political independence or the territorial integrity of the State or
the existence or basic functioning of institutions indispensable to
ensure and protect the rights recognized in the Covenant... Eco-
nomic difficulties per se cannot justify DEROGATION measures.
Quoting, Daniel O'Donnell, Commentary by the Rapporteur on
DEROGATION, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 23, 23-25 (1985) (restating
principles).
250 See supra Part II (Section II: Economic Globalization and the Rise of the TNC).
251 See supra Part I.
252 See supra Part III.
213 See supra Part II (diversification of important players on the global screen in-
cluding TNC as some of the wealthiest "economies" and political players); see also
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dominant international development and trade regimes have privatized
many public functions, constrained the ability of the state to act in arenas
previously left to its sovereign discretion, and have facilitated the accumu-
lation of extensive resources and authority in TNCs.2
5 4
Assigning to the TNC the legal "capacity" to bear duties directly
under international human rights law seems structurally viable. The treat-
ment of the United Nations Organization in civil proceedings 255 and various
non-state private and collective actors in criminal trials,256 as well as other
legal and market-based attempts at regulating corporate behavior, illustrate
the proposition that including TNCs in the international human rights
framework does not necessitate deemphasizing the central authority or obli-
gation of the state in protecting and promoting human rights.257 These non-
state entities may be consciously located in the hierarchy of international
law at an intermediate level: lower than the state, but higher than the posi-
tion of individuals, thus appropriately taking into account TNCs' elevated
contemporaneous position in the global economic order258 while preserving
the sanctity of sovereignty and emphasizing state participation rights under
international law processes. Additionally, by positioning the TNC at an in-
termediate level in the spectrum, the right of a population to self-determina-
tion in governance is maintained.
Concurrent with this narrow construction of a TNC's subjectivity
under international law follows the obvious inquiry: subjectivity with re-
gard to what? Once we bestow a modified international personality on the
TNC through the theory of "capacity," 259 the question shifts from whether
regulation can occur to what should be the ostensible contours of that regu-
lation. By emulating the historic trend to extend legal capacity to various
Feeney, supra note 48, at 325 (swap over to private financing pushed by WB,
private capital flows by 1996 equaled 86% of total funds in a notable trend change).
254 See MEYER, supra note 51, at 75-76; Wells & Elias, supra note 51, at 146;
Ratner, supra note 8, at 458-459; Bamodu, supra note 12, at 162; Kinley & Tadaki,
supra note 7, at 935-937; Alston, supra note 6, at 17; Aderman & Kariyawasam,
supra note 48, at 181.
255 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Ad-
visory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Lexis 6 (Apr. 11).
256 See SAHNI, supra note 3, at 62-63; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-
17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
257 See CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 70-73; Steinhardt, supra note 141, at 224-225.
258 Ratner, supra note 8, 494-495.
259 CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 70-73.
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non-state actors260 and reflecting on the TNC's current capability of carry-
ing enforceable rights under such agreements as NAFTA and even under
international regimes constructed by the WTO or the World Banks' Interna-
tional Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 261 state preemi-
nence may still be reinforced while adapting the international human rights
framework to a new diversity of players. In this regard, one must consider
which obligations, either positive or negative, may be properly assigned to
the TNC?
Section I An Equation for Establishing the Scope of Obligation
Any test for ascertaining the contours of the TNC's human rights
responsibilities must stem from the basic precepts of human rights ideology.
First, the individual is protected from incursions on their rights by any and
all parties, because rights flow from the individual outwards. 262 Second, the
rhetoric of state sovereignty and public official immunity cannot be used to
shield those entities guilty of violations from responsibility. 263 However,
despite this second factor, the third element of this equation recalls the
state's primary responsibility for protecting and promoting rights vis-A-vis
260 See generally Shelton, supra note 14, at 307-317; Reparations for Injuries Suf-
fered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. Lexis 6 (Apr. 11); SAHNI,
supra note 3, at 62-63; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment
(Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment
(May 7, 1997).
261 JAGERS, supra note 47, at 237; BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 58, 12-13;
Reinisch, supra note 6, at 85; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 946; Aderman &
Kariyawasam, supra note 48, at 181; ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.
262 See supra Part I.
263 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 27, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002).
The multilateral treaty establishing the permanently standing in-
ternational criminal court states: "This Statute shall apply equally
to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.
In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government,
a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representa-
tive or a government official shall in no case exempt a person
from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and
of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. Immuni-
ties or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law,
shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person.
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its population. Retaining this hierarchy is preferable because of the overall
configuration of international law, the undesirability of eliminating rights to
self-governance, and the concentrations of wealth and power retained by a
significant subset of nations. Lastly, while this calculation for determining
human rights obligations takes an inflexible stance on negative obligations
as is required by human rights doctrine, echoing the progressive realization
policies governing many contemporary rights the positive obligations of the
TNC should reflect an entity's ability to promote realization according to
resources, ability, and relevant other considerations. 264
To that end, Professor Ratner's first two inquiries in his multi-fac-
eted examination for ascertaining the contours of the TNC's human rights
duties make a great deal of sense. 265 An analysis of the relationship the
TNC shares with both the state and the affected population(s) seems rele-
vant even according to the interpretation of prominent corporate organiza-
tions.266 Under the calculation proposed in this Article, the obligations of
the TNC may become increasingly reflective of the state's broader obliga-
tions as the relationship between the state and TNC becomes increasingly
favorable to the TNC, at least in regards to the subject matter over which
the two entities are interacting. The TNC's obligations may then rise pro-
portionally to those of a nation similarly situated in resources, control, and
264 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) ("Each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.").
265 Ratner, supra note 8, at 496-509.
266 Id.; see Gareth Llewellyn, Group Director, Business Leaders Initiative on
Human Rights, Speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly prepara-
tory process for the High-level Plenary meeting on 14-16 September 2005 (Sept.,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.blihr.org/Pdfs/BLIHR%2OSpeech%2023
%20June%202005.pdf) (when governments are unwilling or unable to fulfill their
human rights obligations the role of business becomes more important... to avoid
being complicit in human rights violations, and to use their potential to relieve
poverty and build sustainable economic growth). The Business Leaders Initiative
on Human Rights is a group of prominent TNCs including General Electric, the
Gap, MTV, and Novartis who have since 2003 advocated for expanding business'
responsibility for not only abstaining from violating human rights, but affirmatively
helping to realize those guaranteed in the UDHR. See Business Leaders Initiative
on Human Rights, Introduction from Mary Robinson, Honorary Chair of BLIHR,
http://www.blihr.org/.
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infrastructure to the extent that its private and corporate nature still circum-
scribes the particular duties owed.2 67 Certain aspects of rights, by nature, are
products of the public realm, and therefore TNCs cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to protect them. The nexus to the affected population should also be
considered, though, in accordance with this Article's thesis, less so in the
'physical territoriality' or 'presence of authority' type context embodied by
the 'concentric circles' voiced by Professor Ratner and Professor Kinley
and Barrister Tadaki, and more so via an examination of the import of the
right in question according to customary international law and the TNC's
capabilities of assisting in its realization within the confines of its private
character. This latter assessment may often be calculated by considering the
physical presence or amount of direct power a TNC has over a distinct
community, but need not and should not always be so done.
In fleshing out the different considerations articulated above, it be-
comes apparent that a certain form of risk is produced by transacting with
politically or economically weaker states in subject areas where state
strength is a theoretical positive. Examples illustrative of this concept in-
clude environmental or workplace health and safety regulations, coupled
with the attendant infrastructure for enforcement. The existence of such le-
gal regimes are a favorable step towards protecting and promoting the re-
spective human rights they target: the rights to a safe workplace 268 or to
health.269 But when the state's capabilities are somehow lacking in these
realms, the TNC's obligations should increase. What is little trumpeted but
which serves well for the purpose of supporting such a conclusion is the
disproportionate financial rate of profitability experienced by TNCs through
their foreign affiliates or activities in many developing countries. 270 While
multiple other considerations factor into investment or corporate develop-
ment strategies, the return on inflow investment from some developing
countries buttresses the rationale for increasing obligations according to
267 See Kinely & Tadaki, supra note 8, at 967 (public nature of certain rights make
them literally non-transferable); see, e.g., JAGERS, supra note 47, at 73 (list of
examples).
268 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
264, at art. 7(b) ("Safe and healthy working conditions.").
269 Id. at art. 12(b) ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health... [states must take steps towards]... The improvement of all aspects
of environmental and industrial hygiene.").
270 Bamodu, supra note 12, at 158; see also Baez, Dearing, Delatour, & Dixon,
supra note 45, at Part (B)(1) (TNCs seek foreign production site because of low
labor costs and environmental regulation associated costs).
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both profit and situational instability assessments. Profit from inflow invest-
ment for TNCs in Africa, for example, rose sharply in the 1990s. 27 1 From
that date forward, the return on direct investment has averaged 29%, as
much as double the rate of return from any other region including devel-
oped nation clusters in the same time period. 272 Similarly, the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development noted that some of the most
recent significant developments in foreign direct investment have been
those attached to natural resources and related industries. 273 Despite the
noted degradation of conditions in many of the pertinent states, increasing
demand for resources has motivated investment in expectation of high
profit yield.274 Geographical considerations combine with those of an indus-
trial nature to define the extent of the responsibilities TNCs have in relation
to the population.
In exchange for the profitability of interacting with a particular ge-
ography or the profitability of engaging in a certain business activity or
services, foreseeable consequences of engagement become relevant. By
looking at the TNC's relationship to the state, its obligations increase ac-
cording to its ability to facilitate or compound violative governmental be-
havior through its own actions. For example, Trafigura's obligation to
investigate and ensure the proper disposal of its hazardous waste shipment
increased when it chose Cote d'Ivoire, a nation known for its political insta-
bility, economic depression, and infrastructural incapability to safely dis-
pose of toxic wastes. Profiting from transacting with developing nations,
particularly those categorized as problematically fragile or unstable2 7 5 car-
271 Bamodu, supra note 13, at 158.
272 Id.
273 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Press Release: Foreign
Direct Investment Rose by 34% in 2006, (UNCTAD, Sept. 1 2007), available at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=7993&inttemIlD= 1528&
lang=l (last visited May 1, 2008) ("One of the most significant developments in
FDI over the past two or three years has involved natural resources and related
industries. Despite some unfavourable developments for foreign investors in such
industries, high demand for natural resources-and, as a result, the opening up of
new potentially profitable opportunities in the primary sector, such as gas and oil
development in Algeria-are likely to attract further FDI to the extractive indus-
tries. FDI in this sector will be examined in greater detail in UNCTAD's World
Investment Report 2007."). Other developing nations have experienced upward
trends in increases inflow as well with the exception of the Latin American coun-
tries which have experienced a decrease. Id.
274 Id.
275 World Bank 2006 LICUS List, supra note 78 ("fragile states" raise particular
concerns which must be considered in developing business relations).
2008
190 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14
ries with it predictable realities and therefore attendant responsibilities as
the state becomes less likely to appropriately regulate either because it lacks
political will, an imbalance in strength exists, or the pressures of economic
globalization dominate. In addition, Trafigura's profitable though inherently
dangerous commercial activities-toxic waste removal and shipment-fac-
tor into determining its human rights obligations, especially in the context
of its interactions with a weak domestic environmental and human rights
regulatory structure. Trafigura's commercial activities carry both the poten-
tial for significant profit and the evident potential to cause great damage to
human rights enjoyment. Correlating these two conditions, political/eco-
nomic instability and potential consequences of industrial/service activity,
the civilian population becomes increasingly dependant on and affected by
the TNC's independent behavior respecting the protection and promotion of
their rights. Therefore, the TNC's responsibilities increase proportionally.
The desire to foster, or in the very least refrain from deterring, cer-
tain commercial activity will figure as a common objection to imposing any
international regulation for human rights requirements on TNCs. In re-
sponse, it is helpful to note that TNCs are not forgoing all profit merely
because they assume certain human rights responsibilities in addition to
their other priorities. As creations of law, society may expand the TNC's
goals and functions if it so desires, and there is no particular obstacle to
reconfiguring the nature of its legal identity, which springs from the law at
its very outset. 276 Obligations, particularly those of an affirmative nature,
may therefore be incorporated into the corporate form if technically re-
quired. Adjudging the sufficiency of affirmative steps taken to assist in the
realization of human rights is admittedly difficult, especially in cases relat-
ing to rights traditionally thought of as economic, social and cultural in
character. This set of rights has yet to serve as an independent cause of
action before an international human rights tribunal, and on the whole
rarely served as a substantive cause of action before regional organs.277 Re-
276 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) ("A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to
its very existence.").
277 There currently exists no international tribunal for adjudicating violations of
economic, social and cultural rights. Regional bodies have a minimal, though more
developed, jurisprudence in this realm though trends show a disinclination to deal
with them outside of their relationship to civil and political rights except, only
recently, in the European system, or to attach particular affirmative obligations to
them in general. See David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic
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cently, however, an increased focus on the justiciability of and the defining
of these rights through regional and domestic jurisprudence as well as inter-
national philosophical inquiry has begun to demarcate the core substance of
these rights and attach to them flexible but positive financial obligations.
278
Rights Through Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J INT'L L. 53, 54, 68-88
(2006); Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for
Socio-Economic Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 35, 37-39
(2006). See also, James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethink-
ing Supranational Litigation of ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL Rights in the Americas, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 217, 226-227 (2004) (Latin American states in theory acknowledge
the binding nature of social, economic, and cultural rights which require positive
actions, but adjudication before the Inter-American Court has been rare and only
limited economic and social rights are even granted a right of petition).
278 See Craig Scott & Parick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justice-
able Guarantees, Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 77-82, 104-105, 111 (1992) (talking about three levels of obligations often
discussed regarding the state and their obligations to help progressively realize the
human rights enumerated in the ICESCR. The Council of Europe has found viola-
tions of rights and demanded affirmative financial remedies, for example, the right
to housing. The Inter-American system has ordered preventative health measures);
Johan D. van der Vyver, Symposium, Municipal Legal Obligations of States Par-
ties to the Rights of the Child: The South African Model, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
9, 38-40 (2006) (South Africa's progressive constitution allows for the enforcement
of positive obligations on a range of rights including those traditionally construed
as economic, social, and cultural rights. Several examples include housing and ac-
cess to medications); Marcus, supra at 277, at 63-65 (various domestic systems
have found the state lacking in its fulfillment of economic, social and cultural
human rights and have mandated positive steps in target of promoting those rights);
Marc J. Cohen and Mary Ashby Brown, Development Goals and Indicators: Ac-
cess to Justice and the Right to Adequate Food: Implementing Millennium Devel-
opment Goal One, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 54, 55-57 (2005) (looking at
India, Brazil, and South Africa legal systems in affirmative obligations on procur-
ing the right to food. The Indian Supreme Court has made interim orders mandating
the nation to feed the needy. While cases have not yet come before the Brazilian or
South African courts, both national high courts have ordered the state to implement
and budget for the realization of rights, most notably health and housing rights); see
also People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors., (S.C. 2001), Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 196/2001, available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/
interimorders.html#boxl4 (last visited May 1, 2008). Order of 28 November 2001:
Mid-day Meal scheme:
We direct the State Governments/ Union Territories to implement
the Mid-Day Meal Scheme by providing every child in every
Government and Government assisted Primary Schools with a
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Regarding civil and political rights, judicial systems at all levels have
proven ready to impose affirmative financial obligations as part of remedial
schemes, though exact numbers are rare. 279 A productive legal process has
emerged in which a rights-based focus controls. Once a violation has been
found, the state is allowed the flexibility of fulfilling the attendant obliga-
tions in whichever manner it judges most efficient, so long as its obligations
are completely satisfied. Granting a similar flexibility in formulating the
methods by which the TNC may fulfill its obligations facilitates both the
ability of the corporation to retain profitability while addressing the TNC's
role and power in the new global order and its ability to affect human rights.
In sum, the substantive contours of TNCs' responsibilities derive
from an analysis of the TNC's power in relation to the state in either an
overall or an industry/service-specific capacity, as increasingly privatized
public services pivotal to human rights realization are often implicated. Ad-
prepared mid day meal with a minimum content of 300 calories
and 8-12 grams of protein each day of school for a minimum of
200 days. Those Governments providing dry rations instead of
cooked meals must within three months [February 28, 2002] start
providing cooked meals in all Govt. and Govt. aided Primary
Schools in all half the Districts of the State (in order of poverty)
and must within a further period of three months [May 28, 2002]
extend the provision of cooked meals to the remaining parts of
the State.
279 See, e.g., Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Perti, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, at 441-456 (Nov. 25, 2006) (Peru, other than reparations
consisting of compensatory, pecuniary, and non-pecuniary damages for the benefi-
ciaries of the 41 deceased and the remaining living victims, must bear the unspeci-
fied cost for fully investigating the torture and death of prisoners, ensuring non-
repetition of the human rights violations, assume the costs of delivering bodies of
the deceased to family, of publicly apologizing on behalf of the state with families
and press present, of publishing and disseminating the present judgment, of assum-
ing the medical and psychological rehabilitation of the victims and their families,
and of adopting training and educating public actors); Case of Claude Reyes et al.
v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, at 163, 165 (Sept. 19, 2006)
(Chile, other than reparations, must bear unspecified costs of adopting measures to
guarantee the right to access of state-held information and of adequately training
public entities to that end). The Council of Europe makes publishes a regularly
updated report of measures states have taken in order to fulfill their obligations
under European Court of Human Rights judgments. The violation list at this point
only enumerates civil and political rights. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GENERAL MEA-
SURES ADOPTED TO PREVENT NEW VIOLATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (May, 2006), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human-rights/ex-
ecution/H-Exec(2006) 1_GM_960e.doc.
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ditionally, the intensity of the TNC's obligations must also reflect its rela-
tionship to the population, not merely in the physical sense, but in the more
expansive sense of the TNC's capacity to affect rights. Finally, in address-
ing the actual financial expenditures required relating to affirmative obliga-
tions, the TNC must be allowed to retain control over the methods by which
it satisfies its obligations, preserving the agency required to operate profita-
bly while simultaneously fulfilling its human rights obligations.
Section H: Negative Obligations
Bearing in mind the four principles enumerated in the introduction
of this Part and the above-detailed paradigm, the equation for negative obli-
gations under this calculation essentially bars the TNC from all behavior
transgressing directly against or complicit in violating human rights, unless,
as is the rationale governing justifiable state derogation, the greater good's
most fundamental human rights are threatened. 280 Of course, this does not
speak to the more difficult ascertainment of positive obligations, but it does
at least clearly denote the TNC's immediate duty to refrain from some of
280 See Gross, supra note 249, at 459-460. To play out this hypothetical, a TNC
would obviously be allowed to regulate the workspace for health and safety, since
the broader sub-set of the community's right to health would be threatened other-
wise. In the same vein, a corporation would be permitted to terminate an employee
despite the right to possess the opportunity to earn a living through work under the
ICESCR (Article 6) for violating the potential right to health of the larger popula-
tion. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
264, at art. 6. Similarly, we may look at the usual contentious labor rights provi-
sions (Article 8) which include the right to strike. The right to strike may only be
abrogated by the TNC when the larger community's direct health and safety or life
might be in danger, for example, the right to bar striking has been constitutionally
upheld in the United States in relation to firemen and policemen because of the
immediate and grave direct threat to public safety that would ensue. See, e.g., City
of New Orleans v. Police Ass'n of Louisiana, 369 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1979); Michael A. DiSabatino, Who are employees forbidden to strike under state
enactments or state common-law rules prohibiting strikes by public employees or
stated classes of public employees, 22 A.L.R.4th 1103, § 2(a) (1983) ("perhaps the
most clear-cut example of employees whose functions do involve the public safety
and who therefore must be included within prohibitions against public employee
strikes are police officers and firefighters."). The National Labor Relations Act
requires Unions to give an employer ten days notice before striking in the health
care industry so that it may find replacements and ensure the continued care of
patients. This seems a reasonable partial restraint on a human right for the purposes
of protecting the rights of a larger group. See National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. 158(g) (2000).
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the more overtly deleterious behavior evidenced in many of the cases being
currently litigated,28 1 and imposes upon TNCs the remedial responsibility
for those violations which result from its improper actions. 28 2 Delineating
the TNC's immediate or progressive affirmative obligations is unfortu-
nately a more complicated process. With the relative complexity of ascer-
taining positive obligations in mind it is easier to first explore the negative
duties of TNCs separately before moving on to explore the positive duties
which result from this Article's thesis.
Professor Ratner proposes a hypothetical dissecting the freedom of
speech. 283 However, in utilizing a private party balancing scheme as he
does, Professor Ratner undermines the human rights analysis in his exam-
ple.2 84 As this Article notes, the concept of human rights as we currently
understand it-a dignity central to the order of humanity-is especially in-
sulated from compromise by goals of financial profit, 285 a core interest of
the corporation implicit in Professor Ratner's examination. 286 When the
281 See, e.g., Sarei v Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193, 1198, 1209-1210 (9th Cir. 2007)
(war crimes, racial discrimination); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 63209, 4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (crimes against humanity); Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (genocide, war crimes,
enslavement, and torture); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis
28813 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (crimes against humanity, torture, arbitrary arrest and de-
tention); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(regarding several defendants' hiring of Columbian paramilitary to impede union
organizing activity).
282 Suing and holding the corporation accountable for negative violations is prefer-
able to imposing solely individual criminal liability on corporate leadership in sev-
eral respects other than those ethically inherent, though it is not mutually exclusive
to doing so. First, a broader set than the criminal-penalty bearing set of rights may
be applied. Additionally, TNCs have resources unavailable as a practical rule to
private individuals of even the wealthiest variety. The reparations to victims could
thus generally only be possible through access to the corporate coffers. Financial
resources for remedial measures on the broader basis (for example to ensure the
wrong does not reoccur in the future) are also necessary. Finally, the construction
of institutional history can influence the entities behavior far into the future in a
manner individual criminal liability does not. Thus, trying the corporation as an
entity liable for wrongs committed against human rights, in addition to any particu-
larly prominent individuals therein, serves the function of enabling future progress
and proper restitution.
283 Ratner, supra note 8, at 514-515.
284 Id. at 513-515.
285 See Skogly, supra note 70, at 246 (companies driven by profit maximization).
286 See Gross, supra note 249.
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consideration of private economic profit is allowed to figure so prominently
in determining the contours of negative obligations, the right to free speech
and, subsequently, the rights to association or political organizing which
flow there from are nearly completely eliminated. Professor Ratner does not
expressly address speech critical of the corporation in the context of at-
tempting to motivate policy or behavioral changes in the institution. How-
ever, sanctioning of penalization for "public speech that insults the
company to consumers, [or] lures away employees... since [it] impinge[s]
on core interests of the company" 287 implicate just such types of employee
free speech. It is understandably within the corporation's strong financial
interest to eliminate employee speech targeted at garnering broader public
support for urged boycotts ("insults against the company to consumers"), or
employee strikes ("lures away employees"), or provoking legislative scru-
tiny and regulation affecting its bottom line through critical ("insulting")
speech. The right then becomes nearly universally threatened.
A realistic assessment of the corporate examples provided in this
Article show the shortcomings of introducing a private financial interest
balancing act to govern the negative obligations of the TNC, even though
such considerations may factor more appropriately into affirmative obliga-
tions. To illustrate, we examine Rio Tinto's behavior in Papua New
Guinea 288 and Coca-Cola's in Columbia, 289 the examples given in this Arti-
cle which best demonstrate the repercussions of allowing TNCs to violate
their negative obligations to refrain from limiting freedom of speech.
Through the examples of these two TNCs, we see that, under a
paradigm allowing for profit interests to modify negative human rights obli-
gations, two disconcerting results materialize. First, in turning to Rio Tinto,
we see that the ability of Rio Tinto's employees 290 to critique the TNC is
perhaps as fundamental, if not more so, than their ability to critique the
PNG government itself.29I Rio Tinto's position dominated its relationships
to both the state and the population. To allow the TNC to abrogate or dero-
gate from292 ensuring its employees' or the surrounding community's right
to publicly decry its activities by applying a standard significantly less strin-
287 Ratner, supra note 8, at 514.
288 See Sarei v. Rio Tino, 456 F. 3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
289 See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
290 Protest organization was spearheaded by a landowner who was also an em-
ployee. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Francis
Ona led the sabotage after sixteen years of ignored protests).
291 Supra Part II (Transnational Corporation Example III - Rio Tinto).
292 Ratner, supra note 8, at 514. Professor Ratner allows for derogation from all
obligations except those which are non-derogable for the state. Id. at 515.
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gent than that which governs justifiable state derogation, 293 the Bougainvil-
leans' ability to improve their human rights conditions are severely
curtailed. Barring the TNC from restricting freedom of speech insulting to
the corporation does not eliminate the TNC's right to protect itself against
speech which harms its interests but is unfounded. Malicious libel and defa-
mation, for example, may be defended against and litigated as it is without
sufficient grounding in the realities of the situation. But to curtail speech
based on the foundation of loyalty or harm to business interests would, for
all intent and purposes, effectively eliminate the right to freedom of speech
and the potential positive impact on human rights attached to that right.
Though an extreme example, Rio Tinto's study demonstrates the imperative
of applying similar limitations on the corporate entity's ability to derogate
when conceptualizing its negative obligations. The island's landowners and
employees were silenced by the TNC's actions; the government would not
have undertaken military operations and instituted the supply blockade had
Rio Tinto not requested it.294 But replications of this model, with less severe
conditions, play out regularly. The TNC's relationship to the increasingly
privatizing economy 295 is such that its policies and actions influence the
day-to-day realization of individuals' human rights often in larger part than
do a state's actions. 296
Similar results can be seen in Coca-Cola's repression of union or-
ganizing, 297 which is in essence the repression of a mode of speech critical
of the corporation's inequitable policies and behavior. Improving condi-
tions, whether individually or collectively, requires the ability to criticize,
often aggressively or vociferously, the TNC's behavior, and to disseminate
that critique to others in the workspace and the broader community.2 98 Al-
293 For the greater good, or "life of the nation." See Hum. Rts. Comm., General
Comment No. 29, supra note 266, at para. 2, 3, et. al., Gross, supra note 249, at
459-460.
294 Sarei v. Rio Tino, 456 F. 3d 1069, 1078-1079 (9th Cir. 2006).
295 See Baez, Dearing, Delatour, & Dixon, supra note 45, at Part B(2)(e); see also
Alston, supra note 6, at 17-18; MEYER supra note 51, at 77.
296 MEYER supra note 51, at 85 (citing Peter French's argument that corporations
have a larger influence on day-to-day lives because they, "define and maintain
human existence within the industrialized world.").
297 Supra Part II (Transnational Corporation Example II - Coca-Cola).
298 Union organizing is often seen as the most necessary step for obtaining other
rights relating to the work place. See Jedrzej George Frynas, The Transitional Gar-
ment Industry in South and South-East Asia: a Focus on Labor Rights, in TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 162, 167 (Jedrzej George Frynas &
Scott Pegg eds., 2003).
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lowing TNCs to infringe on this right under the auspices of maintaining or
increasing profit or in defense of loyalty, as noted above, is inherently prob-
lematic, as the right will almost always be subject to reduction under the
paradigm. Whether construed in terms of civil and political rights or as an
economic, social, and cultural right, the right to speech geared towards col-
lectively improving conditions is an object of TNC protection to the same
extent as the state is bound. Though currently the status of collective or-
ganizing is unclear under varying state treatments, Coca-Cola helps us ex-
plore the second set of considerations which point to the non-viability of
localized derogation of speech as attached to unionization. Because of its
transnational character, 299 Coca-Cola is exemplary for helping us evaluate
the impact of the corporation's actions through the alternative lens of the
geographically unrestricted multinational character of the TNC and its im-
plications. Coca-Cola's obligations can be read both in the local context as
was Rio Tinto above, but also in the broader context of its global
operations.
The proliferation of the modern state's reference points and the re-
sulting influence by those sources on its practices should be considered.
Induced by the increasing percentage of private investment in overall long-
term foreign capital levels, 300 the state, in order to attract private corporate
business, is subject to and informed by the international dialogue of human
rights resulting from TNC behavior.31 Permitting direct infringement on
the freedom of speech in a localized workspace is a decision with broader
impact on the national and global realization of that human right, as states
seek to replicate less strident or onerous conditions in order to attract neces-
sary in-flow. 302 Contained infringement influences state decisions regarding
which rights they wish to codify or enforce and either fosters or allays the
state's concerns regarding loss of private foreign investment.3 03 Coca-
299 Klebnikov, supra note 96 (operations in all but four countries in the world).
300 MEYER supra note 51, at 77.
301 See Frynas, supra note 298, at 179.
302 See generally Jessica Woodroffe, Regulating Multinational Corporations in a
World of Nation States, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 131, 132 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (third
world governments reduce standards to attract foreign investment); Chris Avery,
Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 17, 23 (Menno T. Kamminga &
Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) (discussing "race to the bottom" in labor market as
developing nations seek to undercut competition and attract investment).
303 See Shelton, supra note 14, at 294-296; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at
1007-1008 (labor rights requirements were particularly opposed by developing
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Cola's actions in Columbia, then, project the corporation's appreciation for
cultural and political climates in which the freedom of speech is not fa-
vored, adversely affecting the right as developing countries seek to con-
struct host friendly environments. 30 4
In addition to strongly influencing international norms by its actual
and perceived behaviors and desires, Coca-Cola's protection of freedom of
speech in those nations where it lacks excess power over both state govern-
ance and the population registers differentiating treatment based on ethnic
or national origin, an impermissible delineation. 3 5 These latter arguments
would forbid Coca-Cola's direct attempts or complicity in silencing protests
over its operations and employment practices.30 6
The reasoning supporting the forbiddance of directly violative be-
havior by the TNC also extends to the quasi-negative but also somewhat
positive obligation to refrain from profiting from a state's own iniquitous or
violative behavior. 30 7 The example posited in this Article was Coca-Cola in
Sudan.308 First, it would seem that the TNC would necessarily have to emu-
countries who saw them as forms of protectionism designed to remove the advan-
tage of cheap labor in those countries); Wells & Elias, supra note 51, at 144
("States are unlikely to take action against multinational corporations in order to
protect labour standards and human rights because of fears of losing much needed
foreign investment."); Woodroffe, supra note 302, at 132; Avery, supra note 302,
at 23.
304 See generally Frynas, supra note 298, at 179 (TNC's activities may influence
country human rights policy, for example, encourage low-wages and poorly en-
forced labor rights legislation).
305 Both the ICCPR and ICESCR forbid discriminatory treatment in the protection
or assistance in realizing of rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
264, at art. 2(2); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193, 1209-1210 (9th Cir. 2007)
(recognizing racial discrimination as an international customary norm).
306 See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Though
of course, less extreme forms of silencing than assassination would also be covered
under this discourse.
307 See supra pgs 17-18, 22-24 (Coca-Cola in Sudan); see also Avery, supra note
302, at 24 (quoting Desmond Tutu, "I haven't heard similar arguments [that sanc-
tions do not work] brought forward.. .when sanctions are applied to... Libya.. .I
have to say that I find this new upsurge of altruism from those who suddenly dis-
cover they feel sorry for blacks very touching, though its strange coming from
those who benefited from cheap black labor for so many years... for your massive
profits have been gained on the basis of our black suffering and misery.").
308 Id. (along with apartheid in South Africa).
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late the state's practices and law, thus directly participating and perpetuat-
ing the violation of human rights. Additional theoretical justification can be
found pursuant to the four human rights principles given earlier in this
Part.309 Accordingly, the TNC must at the very least forgo profiting from
transacting with problematic states when an international customary law is
implicated. In heeding the state-centric formulation of customary law while
still maintaining the understanding that human rights responsibilities lie on
all entities, crimes such as slavery, racial discrimination, 310 war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide become practices in which the TNC
can have no affiliation
Section III: Positive Obligations
The more complicated aspect of the question of TNC human rights
responsibility asks what affirmative steps the entity must take in order to
discharge its obligations.3" Focusing on the impacts of economic globaliza-
tion, Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki note that the increased priva-
tization of public functions and the agglomeration of historically state-
marked funds into private hands warrant this inquiry.312 To accommodate
the realities of the contemporary economic and political landscape, a human
rights discourse should be established based on an analysis of the relation-
ships between the TNC and the state and communities affected.
Seeking to expressly define the outermost boundaries of affirmative
duties is ideologically problematic and likely impossible in all practicality.
Much like the evolution of individual criminal liability and state human
rights obligations as a whole, a gradual evolutionary flexibility must be
worked into the process.3 13 The outward expansion of these boundaries may
occur from different sources, from, for instance, the incremental shifts in
309 Supra pgs 50-51.
310 Unlike the other enumerated crimes which are often the listed as international
customary law violations, I am drawing upon anti-discrimination in accordance
with Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193, 1209-1210 (9th Cir. 2007).
311 It is at this point that Professor Ratner's conclusion that such responsibilities
will be limited diverges from Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki's note that
such obligations should in fact occur. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 966.
312 Id.
313 Human rights is a fluid constantly emerging process. See MICHAEL WRIGHT &
AMY LEHR, BUSINESS RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: GLOBAL PATTERNS, RE-
GIONAL AND SECTORAL VARIATIONS 49 (United Nations, 2006), available at http://
www.reports-and-materials.org/Business-Recognition-of-Human-Rights- 12-Dec-
2006.pdf (merely because the ideas surrounding TNC obligations change does not
mean they should be discounted. Human Rights is a fluid process).
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the law of nations according to jurisprudence 14 or by mechanisms such as
treaty-based/"legislative" processes whereby standards of acceptable behav-
ior are consciously or actively promulgated after integrating feedback from
corporate representatives.3 15 The fluid process need not erase the character
of the TNC as a private individual3 16 and may continuously circumscribe
the TNC's human rights obligations on account of infrastructural and socio-
economic role differences as well as considerations privileging the state's
role in the hierarchy of the international law structure. Merely, because
these considerations survive, as Professor Kinley and Barrister Tadaki note,
314 See, e.g., Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
315 The ILO for example works with employer associations as part of its unique
triparte governing system. International Labor Organization, Structure of the ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/depts/fact.htm (last visited Mary 1, 2008);
Shelton, supra note 14, at 281. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore how
the various forum in which norms applicable to TNCs might conceivably function
or look like. This Article is primarily concerned with establishing the theories and
levels of obligation a TNC might be subject to in human rights contexts.
316 Concepts of private affirmative obligations for human rights can and do exist,
for example, tax systems provide for the realization of human rights by their very
nature. They support the governmental infrastructure which protects rights through
regulatory and recourse methods, and spending on public welfare promotes the re-
alization of rights in the broader community. Programs guaranteeing certain mini-
mums of education or health care for example are basic tools of human rights
achievement. There are obviously many different theories and reasons for taxation,
but social welfare considerations are often implicated to varying degrees. It may be
possible to think of TNC obligation even in this simpler dichotomy between the
public and private if necessary, with the TNC's global identity allowing interna-
tional direct regulation and its obligations reflecting the increased resources it
posses. See, e.g., United States Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Taxes,
Economics of Taxation, http://treasury.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/econom-
ics.shtml ("Throughout history, every organized society had some form of govern-
ment. In free societies, the goals of government have been to protect individual
freedoms and to promote the well-being of society as a whole."); Marjorie E. Kom-
hauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 623-
624 (1996) (John Rawls' 'Theory of Justice' serves as the basis for one of the
modem viewpoints connecting taxation to rights realization); Kornhauser, Rethink-
ing Redistribution: Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality: Choosing a Tax Rate
Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1727-1737 (2005)
(promotes equality of opportunity, and liberty).
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it does not mean that affirmative human rights obligations are
nonexistent.3 1
7
It is in the act of conceptualizing the affirmative obligations of the
TNC that an evaluation of the TNC's relationship to the state and to af-
fected populations is most productive. Contemplating the TNC's relation-
ship to the state and populations seems desirable not merely because it in
some fashion generates the conditions for imposing a theory of human
rights duty-bearing, for the underlying responsibility already exists,3 18 but,
rather, looking to the TNC's relationship with other actors reinforces the
primacy of the state in international law and fortifies the sovereign-based
system desired by international governments.3 19 The benefit of locating the
TNC's obligation vis-A-vis the state when extrapolating the contours of a
certain duty borrows from the already existent rationale behind extending
liability to non-state actors in human rights settings3 20 while prescribing a
broader set of obligations in response to the increased power and resources
TNCs have gained.
The analysis of the TNC's relationship to the state when contem-
plating affirmative duties takes on a nuanced application. Several levels of
interaction may factor into defining the content or borders of the corpora-
tion's positive human rights obligations. Not only must the overall power
imbalance be examined, but a focus on the relationship betwixt the two
through the narrow perspective of the particular service or business function
of the TNC should be separately considered. In other words, it is beneficial
to look at how much authority the TNC has compared to the state with
regard to a specific subject or operation as privatization is advocated, for
instance, the above-referenced public water resources and infrastructure in
India.12 1 If the power imbalance is high, as is the case between Rio-Tinto
and Papua New Guinea3 22 and between Trafigura and Cote d'Ivoire, 323 the
TNC's levels of obligation should rise substantially, sometimes even to
317 See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 966. However, I again note that the
specific balancing of corporate interests in maximizing profit and individual rights
enjoyment are not a proper mode of analysis.
318 All entities carry obligations to each other by the nature of human rights. See
Goodman, supra note 23; Englard, supra note 23, at 1918-1919.
319 See CLAPHAM, supra note 27, at 73.
320 See Ratner, supra note 8, at 466-467; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 654 (May 7, 1997) (for example, de facto control
by non-state actors).
321 See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
322 See supra Part II (Transnational Corporation Example III: Rio Tinto).
323 See supra Part II (Transnational Corporation Example I: Trafigura).
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levels analogous to similarly situated states, though in keeping with the pri-
vate character of the TNC. This mode of analysis poses somewhat greater
duties on TNCs transacting with extremely politically or economically
weak states, as noted before. 324 However, this method also imposes more
extensive obligations on the private social service and public utility pro-
vider or on TNCs that rely heavily on public resources for their own profits.
For example, consider the several TNCs bidding for water system contracts
in India as the system moves towards privatized control325 or the exhausting
of public water tables for the purposes of reaching profit, as Coca-Cola has
in India.326
This article argues that responsibility should flow derivatively from
the corporation's profiting from historically-administered public services
and thus by functionally serving as the state in a narrow capacity. 327 The
elevation of obligations proposed is not meant to deter TNCs from investing
and developing within these industries. Though the increase in affirmative
duties correlates proportionally with the position of the TNC broadly or in
324 See supra pg 52.
325 Coca-Cola is depleting the public water supply in India. Additionally, interna-
tional lending institutions are advocating privatization of the water system, several
well-known TNCs are bidding for the contracts including Suez, Bechtel, Vivendi
and Thames Water, and several others like Coca-Cola and Pepsi are profiting heav-
ily from selling bottled water. See SHRIPAD DHARMADHIKARY, PRIVATISATION AND
COMMERCIALISATION ON WATER SERVICES IN INDIA (Manthan Adhyayan Kendra
India, 2003) (naming Suez, Bechtel, Vivendi and Thames Water. Also discussing
water privatization agenda of international institution WTO), available at http://
www.jubileesouth.org/news/EpZZZlkuAkDMZZOUuf.shtml; see also Vanda
Shiva, Water Privatization and Water Wars, ZNET COMMENTARIES, July 12, 2005,
http://www.zmag.org/Sustainers/Content/2005-07/12shiva.cfm (last visited Mar.
10, 2007) (naming Suez, Bechtel and Saur).
326 See Loewe, supra note 95 (discussing Coca-Cola's water depletion as well as
profits from bottled water); Kysar, supra note 102 (depletion of public water
sources).
327 See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 966; see also Alston, supra note 6, at 17-
18 (privatization of social welfare services, prisons, asylum processing, education,
health care and utilities has placed non-state actors in the role of the state. Security
and the attendant violence attached to it has been privatized); Reinisch, supra note
6, at 75-76; see also Antenor Hallo De Wolf, Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatiz-
ing War from the Perspective of INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS Law, 13 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 315, 317-320 (2006) (for example privatization of military
operations in Iraq); see Michael Addo, Symposium, HUMAN RIGHTS Perspectives
of Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 667, 671, 678 (2005) (public services in-
creasingly privatized).
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subject-specific capacities as the state's influence decreases, this does not
insinuate that the corporation must now fulfill a purely benevolent or non-
profit role. It is still empowered to profit from its operations. Rather, the
emphasis rests on the space the TNC now occupies in relation to the pub-
lic's human rights. However, the new position must be adequately inte-
grated into private business models and the broader international legal
framework, even if altruism is not to be the TNC's primary purpose.
The simplest corporate example to address is Trafigura. In applying
the three step calculation, an examination of the TNC to the state, the popu-
lation, and retaining a flexible process for fulfilling positive obligations, we
find that Trafigura had the positive duty to independently investigate
whether Cote d'Ivoire as a state, and "Tommy" as a private enterprise, were
sufficiently capable of disposing of the vessel's hazardous waste even
though the transaction would otherwise be legally permissible.3 28 If we look
at Trafigura's relationship to the state, we find a notable power imbalance,
not by virtue of threat, but by virtue of financial need, resource distribution,
and political fragmentation. 329 If we look at the relationship of the impacted
population, we also find a direct nexus resulting in a very serious imbal-
ance. The affected civilians were unable to influence the TNC's decision-
making procedures, had no recourse to preventative measures through state
political processes, and had no practical effective national regulatory or ju-
dicial structures extant for addressing the negative impacts or maintaining
preemptive disincentives for the TNC. Further, the absence of warning
maximized the harm to the residents' fundamental rights which was vio-
lated to such an extent that criminal liability against individual officials may
possibly be attached. 30 The TNC had actual sufficient knowledge, or on
minimum constructive knowledge, of the country's inability to manage
such waste disposals33' as well as the broader continent's troubling history
with transnational waste disposal.332 In relation to the population, the dam-
age potentially wrought by improper care of the hazardous waste was ex-
treme and violated basic fundamental rights such as those to life.333
Trafigura was profiting from a dangerous enterprise activity, whether by
contract for its shipping or through activities of its own which peripherally
generated the waste. Further, the population was particularly dependant on
the TNC because of the unstable economic and political circumstances
328 See supra Part II (Transnational Corporation Example I: Trafigura).
329 See World Bank LICUS List, supra note 78.
330 See BBC News, supra note 62.
331 Id.
332 See Marbug, supra note 90.
333 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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which made effective regulation unlikely, either in technical form or alter-
natively by enforcement.
In turning to the third aspect of the calculation, Trafigura would
have been entitled to proceed in any number of manners so long as it dis-
charged its obligations. It could have chosen to expend the extra capital
necessary to dispose of the waste in the Netherlands, circumventing the
need to undertake extensive investigation because of the relatively powerful
and developed position of the state. Or the TNC could have retained its own
staff for investigating the matter or sought the opinions of outside experts.
Trafigura could have fulfilled its positive obligation through any manner it
deemed most appropriate for the sake of efficiency, so long as it met the
requisite criteria established by the situation. In failing to do so, the TNC
should become responsible for financing immediate and long-term opera-
tions ameliorating the ramifications of the disaster, in collaboration with the
state who remains the primary securer of rights.
The case of Rio Tinto further expands the conceptual boundaries.
Beyond its direct obligation to refrain from leveraging its power to motivate
state human rights violations, from being complicit in violations of norms,
and in directly enacting and perpetuating significant violations, by virtue of
its position and enterprise, the TNC should assume a heightened set of re-
sponsibilities to help actuate an array of human rights. The corporation's
significant power over the PNG government, 334 the nature of the industrial
enterprise from which it was profiting and from which resulted foreseeable
extensive environmental degradation, property accumulation, and negative
human rights consequences to the surrounding communities, and the corpo-
ration's understanding of the underdeveloped status of the area with which
it was transacting, culminate in the entity's enhanced affirmative human
rights obligations. Beyond the most direct actions such as just compensation
for property loss, investment in environmentally safe technologies or prac-
tices, and implementing higher remuneration and benefit packages than
state minimums might require, the TNC would need to invest funds in pub-
lic infrastructure tangential to its business practices. For example, Rio Tinto
would be responsible for developing a local adequate health care system
through which the wellbeing of its employees and their families could be-
come a meaningful right. The TNC might invest in community facilities or
by recruiting sufficiently trained medical staff and securing medical sup-
plies in order to facilitate its employees and the surrounding impacted com-
munity's right to health which is directly affected by the corporation's
activities. The TNC must then look to the manner in which its practices
334 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1148-1149 (C.D. Cal. 2002); JosEPH,
supra note 5, at 35; Hagens, Berman, supra note 129.
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affect the customary human rights standards of the populations in question
and invest accordingly under the flexible strategy posited above.
The most complicated example for delineating positive dimensions
of human rights obligations lies with this Article's water privatization/ex-
ploitation study in India. This hypothetical entails a combination of institu-
tional pressures towards privatization 3 5 in combination with Coca-Cola's
over-use of public water supplies336 from which it profited greatly, and the
projections that a majority of the TNC's revenue would issue from bottled
water in the coming years.3 37 If these circumstances actualize, Coca-Cola
and other corporations profiting from the sale of bottled water, in tandem
with the network of TNCs obtaining contracts under the new privatized
water system regime, bear a reciprocal responsibility for providing neces-
sary quantities of potable water to the impacted populations. 338
Breaking with the physicalist tendencies of the 'concentric circles'
approach,3 39 the applicable community may be understood not only in terms
of a modified de facto control-centered model, but in terms of more nebu-
lous attenuated constituencies. The increase in water prices as an interna-
tional trend requires a broader conception of who is affected by the
privatization, exhaustion of natural resources, or the subsequent profiting by
private enterprises capitalizing on the previously-public commodity or ser-
vice. In short, the collaborating TNCs have obligations to ensure that suffi-
cient potable water is provided to those individuals living in poverty, the
population most affected by the contemporary move towards privatization
and commercial sales of water, whether by refraining from rendering it in-
accessible or by affirmatively providing it.340
Under a flexible approach, Coca-Cola's obligations may vary
greatly both with regard to how the TNC creates the structural capacity to
fulfill this obligation as well as how it discharges its obligations in relation
"I See DHARMADHIKARY, supra note 325.
336 See supra Part II.
331 See Maude Barlow, Blue Gold: The Global Water Crisis and the Commodifica-
tion of the World's Water Supply 36 (Council of Canadians, 2001), http://
www.ratical.org/co-globalize/BlueGold.pdf (last visited May 1, 2008) (Coca-Cola
predicts that its water sales will surpass its soft-drink sales).
338 In other words, those living in poverty. Id. at 2, 14-15, 20, 22, 41 (discussing
unequal access to water for the poor globally, price rises for water under privatiza-
tion as an international trend, water prices eliminating access for the poor and cost
affects in India).
311 See Ratner, supra note 8, at 506-509; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 7, at 963-
964; Draft UN Norms, supra note 9.
340 See Barlow, supra note 337.
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to each state with which it interacts. In India, the TNC could conceivably
develop a production system which causes less devastating effects on the
water tables. At the next level of obligation, if the TNC seeks to continue
financially gaining from bottled water sales and therefore causally render-
ing the essential resource increasingly inaccessible, 341 Coca-Cola may wish
to pool its efforts with other TNCs towards donating the appropriate
amounts of potable water to areas which cannot afford its beverages. These
suggestions are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the
numerous options Coca-Cola could potentially take to retain profit margins
while simultaneously fulfilling the affirmative obligations which result
from its corporate endeavors.
As TNCs create expensive commodities out of quintessential re-
sources and services necessary for the realization of human rights, they bear
the responsibility of ensuring that unjust and adverse effects are not visited
upon various susceptible populations. As is illustrated, this does not mean
that Coca-Cola is unable profit financially from bottled water, only that it
bears the affirmative responsibility of ensuring that its activities, though not
necessarily directly deleterious to human rights, do not negatively impact
and may even promote such rights. Mimicking the state's discretion in
choosing the effective manner in which it will domestically execute its in-
ternational human rights obligations, the options of TNCs should not be
constrained by strict implementation method requirements. TNCs, when
finding themselves assuming the broader responsibilities of the state, must
also be afforded similar discretion and respect for the methods by which
they choose to fulfill their human rights duties. Discretion, however, does
not mean that the TNC does not bear significant human rights duties or is
excused from fulfilling them. Rather, the TNC should find its actions gov-
erned by the basic presumptions of good-faith, measurable by results, which
are applied to the state. 342
341 See id.
342 See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.l/Add.13, para. 3 (2004) ("Article 2 defines the scope of the legal obligations
undertaken by States Parties to the Covenant. A general obligation is imposed on
States Parties to respect the Covenant rights and to ensure them to all individuals in
their territory and subject to their jurisdiction (see paragraph 10 below). Pursuant to
the principle articulated in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-




The dignity inherent in the human condition requires a reconfigura-
tion of the international human rights framework. The imposition of human
rights obligations, particularly of an affirmative nature, upon TNCs is a
fundamental question facing the new century. The realities of our contem-
porary world reinforce the need to assimilate TNCs into the international
human rights regime. Doing so neither defeats democratic rights to self-
determination nor the sovereign state-based system of international law, but
rather it acknowledges the essential truth that non-state actors, particularly
TNCs, have become part of the global fabric of power and implicate human
rights in a way that can no longer be disregarded.
By positioning the TNC in relation to both the population and the
state, we construct a relativist model which projects the duties of the TNC
in accordance with the specificity of the overall relationships of the corpo-
rate entity to the state and population vis-t-vis human rights and which
allows the flexibility of the human rights model to modify those responsi-
bilities over time.
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